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Abstract 
 
 
Conditional cash transfer programs have been proven effective when aiming to decrease 
poverty and increase school enrollment among poor. The Brazilian conditional cash transfer 
program Bolsa Família is the largest program in the developing world and affect 13 million 
families in their everyday life. One of the long-term aims of Bolsa Família is to increase 
school enrollment in Brazil, which also is the focus of this thesis. With human capital theory 
as the foundation and with data from the Brazilian household survey PNAD2011, a regression 
discontinuity design is carried out in order to evaluate the impacts of Bolsa Família on school 
enrollment. As a complement to this analysis, semi-structured interviews with ten 
beneficiaries are conducted. The main result from the evaluation is that Bolsa Família does 
not increase school enrollment but appear to provide help for the children in poor and 
extremely poor families to assimilate education.  
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 5 
1 Introduction 
 
 “(…) ensuring that all children are able to complete primary education 
remains a fundamental, but unfulfilled, target that has an impact on all the 
other Goals”. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General, United Nations, 2012 (The 
Millennium Development Goals Report 2012, pg. 3) 
 
In 2000, the United Nations made a resolution with the aim to eradicate poverty. A step in this 
direction is to provide universal education to all school aged children in the world. As a 
response to this, the Brazilian government instigated the conditional cash transfer program 
Bolsa Família in 2004. There are various reasons for this program, but one of its main 
purposes is to increase school enrollment among children in poor and extremely poor 
families.  This study aims to evaluate the effects of Bolsa Família on school enrollment 
through a regression discontinuity estimation in combination with semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews.  
1.1 Research Question  
 
 Does Bolsa Família affect schooling among children in the beneficiary 
families? 
 
Brazil became the world’s sixth largest economy in 2012 (The Guardian, 2013-03-21). A 
relevant reaction to this is the question of how Brazil managed to go from being an 
underdeveloped country to top ten of the world’s largest economies. Education is considered 
to be one of the main contributors to development according to the United Nation’s 
Millennium Development Goals and one of the main goals of Bolsa Família is to increase 
education among the poor. Therefore it is highly relevant to evaluate the effects of Bolsa 
Família on school enrollment. Since Bolsa Família is the biggest conditional cash transfer 
program in the developing world, considering the number of beneficiary families (Lindert, 
2006), it affects a lot of people in their everyday life. If the program can better the lives of 
those people, it will be a great step towards eradicating poverty in the world. 
1.2 Method 
Most CCTs are randomly implemented; therefore it is possible to evaluate the effects of the 
programs through a control and a treatment group. Since Bolsa Família was not randomly 
implemented, and because of the lack of more vast research about the program, there is a need 
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for another method in order to evaluate the effects of the program. The method used in this 
study is based upon a multi-strategy research. First, a quantitative analysis is made to evaluate 
the possible differences between the beneficiaries and the non-beneficiaries; second, a 
qualitative analysis is conducted to complement the estimation. The quantitative analysis will 
be carried out through a regression discontinuity model and the qualitative analysis will be 
conducted through semi-structured interviews. In order to conduct the regression 
discontinuity design the sample is divided into two groups, the treatment group consisting of 
individuals with a monthly household income per capita between 126 and 140 BRL, and 
therefore eligible to receive Bolsa Família, and the control group with a monthly household 
income per capita between 141 and 155 BRL and not eligible for Bolsa Família. Because of 
the comparison between two similar groups, the effects of Bolsa Família on school enrollment 
can be estimated. 
1.3 Main Result 
The main result of this study is that Bolsa Família has a negative impact on school enrollment, 
but it has a positive impact on the beneficiary children’s possibility to assimilate education. 
There is no difference in the effect of Bolsa Família on school enrollment between different 
age groups. The conclusion is therefore that Bolsa Família appears to have positive short-term 
effects on poverty relief for the beneficiaries while there are no long-term positive effects of 
increased school enrollment.   
1.4 Disposition 
The first chapter discusses Brazil’s economic background, which led up to the instigation of 
Bolsa Família. It briefly presents the basics of conditional cash transfer programs and more 
thoroughly examines the Brazilian conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família, as well as 
presenting a brief literature review. Chapter three review more in depth the theoretical 
framework. The following chapter presents the data used in the estimations, both in the 
quantitative and in the qualitative study. This part is followed by a more extensive chapter 
about the methods used in this study, regression discontinuity design and semi-structured 
interviews. Chapter six presents the results of this paper. The paper is summarized in chapter 
seven by a conclusion about Bolsa Família and its effect on school enrollment among the 
beneficiary families.  
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2. Background 
 
This chapter presents a brief discussion about the economic situation in Brazil. It also 
presents the basics of conditional cash transfer programs followed by a deeper presentation 
of the Brazilian conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família. A short review of the 
existing research is carried out and finally, a presentation of the state capital Florianópolis, 
which was the subject for the interviews in this study. 
 
2.1 Economic Development in Brazil 
Brazil is considered to be one of the last countries that was struck by the economic crisis in 
2008. Because of this and other contributing factors, the Brazilian economy recovered rapidly 
from the crisis. In 2010, the country experienced the highest annual growth in two decades, 
with a real GDP growth of 7.5% (OECD, 2011). Brazil is still experiencing high levels of 
growth, and in 2012, the Brazilian economy passed the UK’s economy and is now the world’s 
sixth largest economy (The Guardian, 2013-03-21). One of the major obstacles to sustaining 
economic growth is the lack of greater household savings in order to make larger investments. 
There are means taken by the government to remove the difficulties with savings and 
investments, such as simplifying the tax system, removing direct lending obligations and 
lowering the bank reserve requirements leading to more long-term investments (OECD, 
2011). Connected to the issue of low levels of savings is the big concern for the wide range of 
income levels among the Brazilian population. Lately, there has been a growing middle-class, 
but the wide income gap is still a great problem (The Brazilian Government, 2013-04-29). 
Even though Brazil has managed to cut the poverty rate by half the last decades, thanks to 
new policies in income distribution and the labor-market, there is still a lot to be done in order 
to reduce poverty and decrease the high levels of inequality. These issues take us to the main 
focus of this paper – the reduction of poverty through federal income grants, in this case a 
conditional cash transfer program.   
2.2 Conditional Cash Transfer Programs 
Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) have been proven effective in diminishing poverty 
and increasing the living standard of the poor in many Latin American countries (Bouillon & 
Tejerina, 2006). The government generally operates CCTs through transferring tax money by 
 8 
monthly payments to the mothers, or in some cases the fathers, of the poor families. Studies 
have shown that the most efficient way to allocate the cash transfers is to give the grant 
directly to the mother, because the mothers are more likely to spend the extra money on the 
children’s education and health (Lundberg et al., 1996). The families that are eligible are 
considered poor or extremely poor1 and meet certain requirements (de Souza et al. 2011). The 
first CCT was instigated in Mexico 1996 and was called Progresa, today named 
Oportunidades2. Progresa aims to target the poorest areas in Mexico to increase school 
enrollment among those families that need help the most. The targeting is conducted through 
a two-stage method and is usually credited with being effective. To ensure the effectiveness 
of the program, it was randomly implemented and is regularly evaluated (Coady, 2003). In the 
end of 2011, Progresa accounted for 5 827 318 families (The Mexican Government, 2013-05-
08).  
 
One of the most well-known and mostly discussed evaluations of Progresa is made by Schultz 
(2001). By using a difference in difference estimation, Schultz (2001) finds that Progresa has 
positive effects on school enrollment. The results are controlled with a probit model and are 
still positive after this control. To evaluate the long-term effects of Progresa, a demographic 
extrapolation of the results has been used to estimate the long-run school attainment of one 
cohort of children. The estimation shows that the increased school enrollment effect will 
proceed in the long run and that the increased school enrollment for girls will decrease the 
gender inequality in school enrollment among poor families. The author concludes that the 
internal rate of return for Progresa is 8% per year. The program was well received by the 
World Bank (Schultz, 2001) and thanks to the positive effects of Progresa, CCTs were 
implemented in most Latin American countries, as well as in other parts of the world 
(Bouillon & Tejerina, 2006).  
 
An evaluation of CCTs in Latin America was made by Boullion and Tejerina (2006). The 
authors reviewed evaluations of social programs in Latin America and find that the results of 
CCTs are mostly positive. In order to avoid distortion of incentives in CCTs, the 
conditionalities have to be properly designed. The level of the grants received by the 
beneficiaries has to be high enough to have an effect on the consumption patterns of the 
                                                        
1 A person is considered extremely poor when the monthly household income per capita is less than 70 BRL and poor 
when the income is between 70 BRL and 140 BRL. 
2 In this paper referred to as Progresa 
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beneficiaries; otherwise the program will not be effective (Bouillon & Tejerina, 2006). CCTs 
are usually more effective than in-kind transfers or price subsidies and the conditionalities 
create a safety net for bad times. The design of the program redirects the decision-making 
from the authorities towards the families receiving the grant (Bouillon & Tejerina, 2006).  
2.3 The Bolsa Família Program 
In 2003, the poverty level in Brazil was 38,7%, which corresponds to approximately 70 292 
000 people living in poverty in Brazil that year3 (CEPAL, 2013-01-30). With the objective of 
reducing poverty, the then-President Luiz Inácio da Silva (Lula da Silva) instigated Bolsa 
Família (Family Grant) in 2004. Bolsa Família is not a completely new program; it is a fusion 
of four previous programs that focused on increasing the school attendance of primary aged 
kids, and assisted families in need to get the sufficient nutrition and universal access to gas 
and electricity through monthly grants to the families (Reimers et al, 2006). As this paper 
focuses on the role of human capital and the results of increased years of schooling, the 
emphasis of the paper is on the educational part of Bolsa Família, previously called Bolsa 
Escola, and its effects. Bolsa Escola was initially introduced in 1995 on regional level with 
the aim of increasing the incentives for the families to send their children to school through 
monthly grants (Sánchez-Ancochea & Mattei, 2011), and was implemented on national level 
in 2001  (Bourguignon et al., 2003). 
 
In order to administrate Bolsa Família, the new ministry Ministério de Desenvolvimento 
Social e Combate à Fome (Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger) was 
founded. The merging of the four programs into one resulted in a decreased administrative 
burden for the ministry and reduced costs for both the beneficiaries and the government 
(MDS, 2013-03-08). In 2011, the cost of Bolsa Família was approximately 0,7% of total 
GDP. When considering the number of beneficiary families, Bolsa Família is today the largest 
existing CCT program in developing countries (Lindert, 2006). In 2011, there were 
approximately 13 million families benefitting from Bolsa Família (MDS, 2013-03-27). 
                                                        
3 In 2003, the population was 181.633 million people. (Calculation: 181633*0,387=70292) (The World Data Bank, 
2013-04-21) 
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Figure 2.1 Public Spending on Bolsa Família as Percentage of Total Current GDP, 2005-2011 
 
Source: Portal da Transparência, 2013-03-11 
 
In figure 2.1 the public spending on Bolsa Família is presented. The public spending as part of 
GDP peaked in 2005 and 2009, and has since 2005 ranged between 0.65% and 0.78% of 
GDP. In 2009, the public spending on education was approximately 16% of the total 
governmental expenditures, and approximately 5% of total GDP. Of the educational spending 
on primary and secondary school, almost 68% is spent on salaries to the staff (UIS, 2011). In 
2010, the pupil per teacher ratio was 22, to compare with USA where the pupil per teacher 
ratio was 14 the same year. The spending on education was approximately 5% of GDP in the 
USA (UIS, 2013-01-24).   
 
Bolsa Família is expressed through three dimensions. The first dimension is the instant 
poverty relief through the income transfers. Through the conditions that the beneficiaries have 
to meet, the second dimension exerts the basic social rights of the population, meeting the 
health needs and universal schooling. The third, and last dimension is called the 
complementary programs and consists of various programs in order to reduce illiteracy, 
generating more income-rewarding work and facilitating the poor to escape the poverty trap 
(SENARC, 2006).  
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Table 2.1 The Conditionalities in Order to Receive Bolsa Família 
Conditionalities  
Mothers (pregnant or breastfeeding) Children 
Pre-natal controls Vaccine Schedule (aged 0-7) 
 
Post-natal controls 
Regular health controls (aged 0-7) 
Participate in nutritional seminars 
Aged 6-15, attend school at least 85% of 
the time 
Aged 16-17, attend school at least 75% 
of the time 
  
Source: MDS, 2013-03-10 
 
In table 2.1 the required conditionalities for Bolsa Família are presented. Since Bolsa Família 
is a CCT, there are conditionalities that must be fulfilled by the beneficiaries. In order to 
comply with these conditions, the primary school aged children have to attend school and get 
yearly vaccinations, and pregnant women have to attend pre-natal care.  
 
The minimum wage in Brazil was 545 BRL in 2011 (Plano Alto, 2013-03-14). The levels of 
the monthly grants, all expressed in BRL, are as follows. 
 
Table 2.2 Monthly Grant from Bolsa Família in 2011 
 
Monthly 
Household 
Income per capita  
Basic Grant  
Grant per 
Children Aged      
0-15  (Max. 3 
Children)  
Grant per Children 
Aged      16-17                
(Max. 2 Children)  
Extremely 
Poor 
0-70 70 32 38 
Poor 71-140 0 32 38 
Source: Relatório de Gestão do Exercício de 2011 (2012) 
 
The families considered extremely poor receive, with or without meeting the conditionalities, 
70 BRL a month per capita in the household. Hence, the poor families do not receive the basic 
grant of 70 BRL, but only the conditioned grant when the conditions are fulfilled. The 
families receive monthly grants per child as well. In 2013, the amount received per children, 
aged 0-15, was 32 BRL, but only for the first three children, there is no grants for the fourth 
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child and on. Since 2009, there is also a grant of 38 BRL4, for children aged 16-17 if they 
attend high school, but for a maximum of two children. 
 
The federal bank Caixa Econômica Federal is responsible for and administers the payments of 
Bolsa Família. The grants are always paid to the mothers of the families; it is only when a 
mother is not present, that the grants are given to the father (Sánchez-Ancochea & Mattei, 
2011).  
 
Since Bolsa Família, unlike Progresa, was not randomly implemented, there is less research 
conducted on Bolsa Família than on Progresa. A few studies have been made to estimate the 
impact of Bolsa Escola on school enrollment. Bourguignon et al. (2003) use a simulation to 
estimate the effects of Bolsa Escola on schooling and child labor. The authors find that the 
children change their behavior due to the program and that the program increases school 
enrollment by approximately 40%. Janvry et al. (2006) support the result from the study by 
Bourguignon et al. (2003). Janvry et al. (2006) evaluate the effect of Bolsa Escola on dropout 
rates and grade retention. The authors found that the dropout rates were reduced but the level 
of grade retention increased. The result is explained by the fact that students, who otherwise 
would have dropped out stay in school because of the program. The data was collected from 
surveys of almost 300,000 children during five years.  
 
There is a limited amount of research on the impacts of Bolsa Família on schooling. Sanchéz-
Ancochea and Mattei (2011) review the existing research on the program and find that Bolsa 
Família has reduced poverty and inequality in Brazil and has increased the usage of health 
and education services. It is also noted that in order for the program to give long-term effects, 
the quality of the health and education facilities in areas with many beneficiaries have to be 
improved.  
 
Oliveira (2008) uses propensity score matching to estimate the impact of Bolsa Família on the 
beneficiaries’ lives. The author concludes that the results are generally positive for the 
beneficiaries of Bolsa Família but finds few statistically significant differences between the 
treatment and the comparison groups. Oliveira (2008) finds that the allocation of time spent 
on schooling instead of working has increased among the beneficiaries. When evaluating 
                                                        
4 Since the instigation of Bolsa Família, the level of the grants as well as the level of poor and extremely poor, has been 
readjusted to meet the inflation 
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school attendance the author finds that other programs complementing Bolsa Família, like 
Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil, PETI5 (Eradication of Child Labor), and other 
school grants, have a larger effect on school attendance. Hence, comparing children in 
families not included in any program with children benefitting from Bolsa Família, the latter 
have higher school attendance. Beneficiaries of Bolsa Família have lower dropout rates than 
both beneficiaries of other programs and non-beneficiaries. The school results have improved 
in some parts of the country because of Bolsa Família but in other parts the result is negative, 
which indicate that the students’ grades are lower due to Bolsa Família. This is explained by 
the lower dropout rates.   
 
Bolsa Família has been under a lot of criticism, mostly from critics of the former president 
Lula da Silva. The critics claim that Bolsa Família is only a way for the president to “buy” 
votes from the poor for the elections by promising them food grants and better health security. 
Critics also use the saying “give a man a fish and you feed him for the day, teach a man to 
fish and you will feed him for a lifetime.“ and indicate that the program only “gives fish to the 
poor, but does not teach them how to fish”. Another criticism against Bolsa Família is that 
“the success of Bolsa Família (…) will depend on many other factors, including the creation 
of more employment opportunities for the poor and progressive reforms in the pension 
system” (Sánchez-Ancochea & Mattei, 2011, pg. 300). Some administrative issues have also 
been criticized in Bolsa Família (Handa & Davies, 2006). The monitoring and the control of 
the fulfillment of the conditionalities are arbitrary and the effectiveness of the targeting varies 
between the municipalities. There is no rule for the fixed time of exit from the program, 
which might imply that individuals will become dependent on the grant. The design of the 
program facilitate manipulation since the monthly household income is self-reported and 
unverified and the questions in Cadastro Único6 concerning income are badly formulated. 
Also, the targeting process is criticized for not excluding non-poor individuals even if the 
targeting of extremely poor works well.  
2.4 The Educational Status in Brazil  
The following diagram displays the level of no schooling in percentage among the population 
aged 15 year or older. 
 
                                                        
5 PETI was instigated in order to diminish the number of children in the labor force (MDS, 2013-03-21) 
6 Further explained in 2.6 
 14 
Figure 2.2 Percentage of No Schooling of Total Population 
 
Source: Barro and Lee (2010). 
 
The percentage of individuals without schooling has decreased from more than 60% in 1950 
to about 10% in 2010. Related to this, the evaluation of the years of schooling is presented in 
the following diagram. 
 
Figure 2.3 Average Years of Schooling of Total Population 
 
Source: Barro and Lee (2010) 
 
In 1950, the average years of schooling was below two years compared to the 2010 level of 
almost eight years of average schooling. Ensino fundamental, primary school, is nine years in 
Brazil (The Swedish Embassy in Brazil, 2009). Since 1950, the average years of schooling 
has increased for individuals aged 15 year or more. The literacy rate in Brazil was 91.4% for 
the population over 15 years old. For people in the age 15 to 24 year olds the literacy rate was 
97.2% the same year (UIS, 2013-01-23). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
n
o
 s
ch
o
o
li
n
g
Year
0
2
4
6
8
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
Year
 15 
2.5 Florianópolis   
Florianópolis is the capital of the state of Santa Catarina, which is located in the southern part 
of Brazil. Santa Catarina is generally considered to be one of the richest states in Brazil, 
contributing 4.0% of total GDP in Brazil 2010 which is approximately the same amount as the 
nine states7 that contributes the least8 (IBGE, 2013-02-07). 0.22%9 of the Brazilian population 
live in the municipality of Florianópolis, and the 11 89010 (Caixa Econômica Federal, 2013-
02-21) beneficiaries of Bolsa Família in Florianópolis represent 0.03%11 of total beneficiaries 
in Brazil (MDS, 2013-03-27. The city of Florianopolis is chosen as base for the interviews 
since the social administration is assumed to work better in a more developed area and it will 
therefore be possible to see the effects of the program.  
2.6 The CRAS 
The interviews were conducted with help from two local CRAS, Centro de Referência de 
Assistência Social (Reference Center for Social Assistant). CRAS exist all over Brazil, with 
the mission to locate, interview and register people who receive less than a minimum wage 
and are therefore eligible for different social programs administered by Cadastro Único 
(Single Social Program Register). Cadastro Único is administrated by the federal bank, Caixa 
Económica Federal, and contains information on all the beneficiaries of Bolsa Família divided 
into municipality. Cadastro Único administrate several beneficiary programs, and Bolsa 
Família as one among these programs (Caixa Económica Federal, 2013-03-21). The 
municipality receives a certain amount each month for each family registered in Cadastro 
Único, and that is why the municipalities’ aim is to register everyone that earns less than a 
minimum wage. The amount the municipality receives depends on the level of GDP of the 
state. The local CRAS that helped with the interviews in Florianopolis were CRAS Leste I 
and CRAS Norte I. There are approximately 40 000 people living in the area of CRAS Leste 
I, and the office attends to around 1 000 families per year. The neighborhoods covered by 
CRAS Leste I are Itacorubí, Lagoa da Conceicão, Barra da Lagoa, Costa da Lagoa, Côrrego 
Grande and Santa Mónica. CRAS Norte I attend families in the areas of Canasvieiras, 
Ingleses, Rio Vermelho and Santinho. CRAS Norte I is roughly as big as CRAS Leste I in the 
number of people living in the area and number of families attended.   
                                                        
7 There are 27 states in Brazil 
8 For further information, see Appendix 1 
9 Population in Brazil, 2010: 190 755 799. Population in Florianópolis, 2010: 421 240 
10 Number of beneficiaries in February 2013 
11 Number of beneficiaries in Brazil: 13 902 155. In Florianópolis: 4 858 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
The following part presents the theoretical framework this study is based upon. It contains a 
general discussion about the human capital theory including a short description of the 
application of the theories on both micro- and macro-level. Some critique against the theory 
will be addressed and empirical evidence for the relationships in the human capital theory 
will be examined.   
 
3.1 Human Capital Theory  
Adam Smith was the first economist to identify individuals’ capabilities and abilities as 
capital during the 18th century (OECD, 2007). Previously, individuals were only considered 
as part of the labor force and their actual abilities were not important as long as they could 
perform physical work. This way of thinking has changed a lot since then, and today the 
OECD define human capital as:  
 
 “(…) the knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embodied 
 in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and  
 economic well-being” (OECD, 2007, p. 29). 
 
During the 20th century, the ideas of Smith were developed into what today is known as the 
human capital theory. The theory is based on the assumptions that investments in education, 
health and other capacities a person might attain through his or her life time, will result in 
increased productivity (Todaro & Smith, 2006). The fundamental idea of the human capital 
theory is that individuals choose to invest in education because they expect higher income in 
the future. Therefore, they are willing to accept a lower income today. The investment 
consists of educational expenditures and forgone income during the time of education. If the 
costs are lower than the expected future earnings, then education is a good investment. This 
way, it is theoretically possible to calculate the rate of return to education (Boissiere, 2004). 
The human capital theory can be divided into theories on micro- and macro-level. The link 
between the two parts of the theory is the idea that increased years of schooling increase 
productivity (Szirmai, 2005).  
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Since the empirical relationship between earnings and schooling is stronger on micro level the 
focus of the discussion will be on human capital theory on micro level.  
3.1.1 Micro Level 
On micro level, the human capital theory has been developed by Mincer (1974), Schultz 
(1961) and Becker (1965), amongst others.  
 
The main equation in human capital theory is generally defined as follows:   
 
ln (y) = a + b * S        (3.1) 
Where:  
y = earnings 
s = years in school 
b = economic return to schooling 
a = income without schooling 
 
Other definitions of the equation exist, but this general equation, used in the Mincer model, is 
a good framework for a brief discussion about the human capital theory.  
 
An empirical relationship between years in school and lifetime earnings exist, but it is 
sometimes considered weak, since years of schooling might not be equal to years of learning, 
due to differences in school quality and ability to learn etc. (Mincer, 1974). However, there is 
strong evidence for a relationship between earnings and the knowledge gained from attending 
primary school. Particularly, there seem to be higher rate of returns to primary school 
education and higher rates of returns to education for women in developing countries 
(Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 2004). When defining cognitive skills instead of years of 
schooling for the estimation of education, there is a strong relationship between education and 
earnings (Glewwe, 2002).  
 
The Mincer model is usually considered as the framework for human capital theory and Jacob 
Mincer is one of the main contributors to the human capital theory on micro level. The 
Mincer model is an attempt to explain the differences in labor income with years of schooling. 
Therefore, the simplest example is a regression of logarithmic earnings on years of schooling. 
This simple relationship is rather weak, partly because the age of the worker is not included in 
the regression. Including the age of the worker in the regression, investment in schooling is 
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assumed to continue even after the individual started working, but at a diminishing rate. The 
diminishing rate is because of the diminishing rate of return to education the more time the 
individual works. The rate of return is diminishing because the period of possibility of 
benefiting from the investment is shorter the older the person gets, in addition to that the 
opportunity cost of education being likely to increase with experience. Therefore, the 
relationship between earnings and work experience is a concave function. The linear function 
of years of schooling and earnings is complemented by a concave function of work 
experience and earnings (Mincer, 1974). 
 
The human capital theory function of earnings can be specified in either logarithmic values of 
time units or value of money. Investment in schooling is easier to express in time units than in 
amount of money, since most people know how many years they attended school but not the 
exact value of money they have spent on schooling, and therefore the specification in 
logarithmic values of time units is favored. When using the human capital earning function it 
is possible to differ between investment in schooling and other types of investments in human 
capital. Otherwise, the result would be the weighted average rate of return to schooling from a 
comparison of two groups with different educational background. The human capital earnings 
function provides more information. Another conclusion from studies of the human capital 
earning function is that an individual who invests more money in schooling tend to invest in 
more on-the-job training as well, but it does not seem to have the same result when testing for 
investment of time instead of money. In order to get a strong relationship between schooling 
and earnings, on-the-job training has to be taken into account (Mincer, 1974). 
3.1.2 Macro Level 
The basic idea of human capital theory on macro level is the same as on micro level, that 
education increase productivity. Education will lead to a more productive labor force and 
consequently economic growth. Solow developed the basic growth theories during the 1960s, 
where education and technological development are treated as exogenous (Boissiere, 2004). 
These ideas were further developed during the 1980s by Romer and Lucas, who treated 
education as endogenous (Boissiere, 2004). 
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The basic growth model can be specified in a general form as defined below by Boissiere 
(2004):  
Y = F ( K , L , H ; T )       (3.2) 
Where: 
Y = Growth 
K = Capital 
L = Labor 
H = Human Capital 
T = Total Factor Productivity (TFP) or the residual of the other independent 
variables in the equation, often denoted technology 
 
The empirical estimations of the impact of education on economic growth do not show as 
strong and stable relationship as the relationship between years of schooling and earnings on 
micro level (Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 2004). If, however, some of the assumptions in the 
Solow model are relaxed, it is possible to find a relationship similar to the one on micro level 
(Boissiere, 2004). 
3.1.3 Critique Against the Human Capital Theory 
The human capital theory has been criticized for the ideas of the educational effects on 
productivity. It is argued that education leads to screening and credentialism (Boissiere, 
2004). The basic arguments are that the years spent in school do not affect the individual’s 
productivity in working life. One of the explanations is that the qualifications obtained in 
school are not necessary for the job performed at work. Another explanation is that education 
is a signal of trainability, as a way to help employers to choose which workers to hire whilst 
the actual training starts when the individual starts working. The screening theory argues that 
the expansion of schooling in developing countries only leads to inflation of diplomas 
(Szirmai, 2005).  
 
The human capital theory has been criticized for excluding social relations and for not 
including a class component in the framework (Bowles and Gintis, 1975). This Marxian 
critique is based on the argument that education maintains structures in society and that the 
rate of return differ between classes in the society. It is argued that the reason for differences 
in earnings is not only due to education but also due to the fact that the individuals are born in 
different social classes (Bowles and Gintis, 1975). 
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The idea behind the theories about social choice is that investment in human capital is 
different from other investments since it is heterogeneous in its nature. The investment in 
education is not only an investment made by the individual but it also demands investments 
by institutions and the government. These two investments have to complement each other in 
order for the investment to yield any return. Hence, the students also have to make decisions 
about the amount of inputs at different school levels to increase the rate of return to their 
schooling. Examples of a student’s inputs are school literature and study effort. One aspect of 
arguments in social choice theories is the macro-micro argument that the investments have to 
match each other on both micro and macro levels. Parameters that appear to be fixed in the 
calculation of the individual can turn into variables when all individuals’ choices are added 
together at the aggregate level. Another argument worth mentioning in the social choice 
theories is the collective choice argument. This aspect of the theory discusses the dilemmas 
when investments affect different groups in the society differently and the following problems 
of summing up of individual investments for the aggregate level (Chattopadhyay, 2012). 
 
The capability approach offers a broader concept compared to the human capital theory. The 
idea is that a vector of essential inputs, like health, education, nutrition etc. leads to freedom 
to choose the kind of life the person wants to live, and not only affects income. Therefore, 
freedom is considered development. Education is a central capability for an individual to be 
able to choose the kind of life the individual wants to live. Education also leads to the 
possibility for an individual to improve and develop other capabilities, like health or nutrition. 
Therefore, in the long run, more and better education is one of the most important 
contributions to development and freedom for an individual (Chattopadhyay, 2012).  
3.2 Policies to Increase School Enrollment 
3.2.1 The Reasons for Public Interventions 
When discussing returns to education it is common to distinguish between private and social 
returns. The social returns include the positive externalities of more education. If the social 
returns are higher than the private returns, public interventions are valid. Other reasons for 
public interventions are usually imperfect credit markets and information asymmetries about 
the benefits of education (Boissiere, 2004). 
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3.2.2 Increasing School Enrollment 
Several attempts to increase school enrollment through different programs have been made in 
different countries. Kremer (2003) evaluates some of the research of some of those programs 
for either increasing the demand for schooling or the supply of schooling. To increase demand 
for schooling, some researchers argue that the easiest way to increase school enrollment is to 
decrease the costs of attending school, while other researchers argue that school has to be at 
an expense, otherwise education will not be considered important. If the school serves a free 
meal during the day or if the school equipment is free of charge, school enrollment increases. 
Health programs, like deworming, appear to have a positive effect on school enrollment. To 
increase the supply of education, attempts to increase the amount of textbooks in the schools 
have been made. These results were mostly disappointing, generally because the textbooks 
were not written in the children’s native language. Building more schools in rural areas, in 
order to reduce the distance to the school, had positive results on school enrollment. One of 
the main problems for the school systems in developing countries is the high incidence of 
teacher-absenteeism. The weak link between teacher-presence and the teachers-payment is 
one of the most common causes of the problem of teacher-absenteeism. A stronger link 
between presence and payment tends to have a positive effect on both teacher-presence and 
student enrollment. Bolsa Família is a way to decrease the cost of schooling for the families 
and it therefore aims to increase the demand for education among the poor families. 
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4 Data 
 
The following chapter addresses the data and the variables that are used in order to complete 
the estimations and interviews made in this study. First, a short description about the survey 
PNAD is presented, followed by information about the variables chosen for this study. 
 
4.1 PNAD2011 
The data used in this paper is first and foremost information from the Brazilian household 
survey Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios, PNAD, (National Household Sample 
Survey), from the Brazilian Geography and Statistical Institute, IBGE.  
 
IBGE implements yearly household surveys with the objective of addressing the lack of 
information on the Brazilian population. The topics that are collected and conducted in the 
survey are those identified as the most important to measure, and that monitor the socio-
economic status and development of the population, such as, housing, labor, education and 
demographic characteristics. Since 2004, PNAD includes a complete coverage of the 
Brazilian territory (MEC, 2013-02-07).  
 
The estimation made in this study will include data from the latest completed survey, which 
contains information collected in 2011, the so-called PNAD2011. The individuals in 
PNAD2011 were randomly selected and were obtained through three different stages: (1) 
municipalities, (2) census areas, and (3) residential units. The sample is based on 
questionnaires of 146 207 households, containing 358 919 individual observations, with 
September 2011 as the month of reference and includes more than 300 variables. The 
interviews took place and were completed in the home of the responders. If, by any chance, 
there was no response from the household the first round of the survey, the household was 
revisited in order to find out the reason for the incomplete responses or the lack of response. 
Measures were taken in order to get the complete response. Considering the quality of the 
data the response rate is 93,2% with a refusal rate of 1,8% (IBGE, 2013-03-08).  
 
One concern with using data from PNAD is that IBGE codes the micro-data through the 
American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII), which is coding through 
numerically coding the answers of the questionnaires. This might lead to errors in the sample 
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used in the estimation, but since the decoding was appropriately done it is unlikely that this 
has yielded any significant errors that would affect the results of the estimation.   
4.1.1 Variables from PNAD2011 
The variables from PNAD2011 that will be used are the following: 
 
Y = The dependent variable is school enrollment. The variable is estimated by the answers to 
the question: “Are you enrolled in school?”. The reason school enrollment is used in the 
estimation is because it is considered to be a good measure of the level of enhancement of 
human capital.  
 
X = The independent variable is whether the family receives Bolsa Família or not. This is a 
binary variable and is based on the answers to the question: “What is your monthly household 
income?”. MDS estimates that there are 13.738.415 poor or extremely poor families in Brazil. 
Since there are 13.353.843 families benefitting from Bolsa Família, the coverage of the 
program is 97.19% (MDS, 2013-03-27) 12 . Thanks to the high rate of coverage, the 
assumption can be made that everyone who reported a monthly household income between 0 
and 140 BRL in PNAD2011 receives Bolsa Família. This is the same way Instituto de 
Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, IPEA, (Institute for Applied Economic Research) does its 
estimations when examining the effect of Bolsa Família on poverty, school enrollment and 
school retake. In PNAD2004 and PNAD2006 there was a variable included that asked directly 
whether the respondent receives Bolsa Família or not. Unfortunately this variable is not 
presented in PNAD2011, but IPEA made comparisons in PNAD2004 and PNAD2006 and 
came to the conclusion that the earlier presented way of estimating whether the respondent 
receives Bolsa Família or not is a convenient and significant method13. Since the grant is 
disbursed to the mothers in the families, the question of whether the individual receives social 
benefits or not is not suitable for this estimation. The answers would be misleading since the 
children in the family are not the ones receiving the benefit and have answered accordingly.    
 
The variables used for the estimation are from PNAD2011, and the following are the 
variables used in the estimation. The year of reference in PNAD2011 is 2011, with September 
as the month of reference, and September 18th to 24th as the week of reference. The 
information about the variables is from the document Dicionário de Variáveis da PNAD2011 
                                                        
12 See Appendix 2 
13 Sergei Soares, Chief of Staff at IPEA, 2013, email 2013-04-18 
 24 
– arquivo das pessoas (IBGE, 2013-04-26)14. 
 5 – State of residence; 27 states  
 18 – Gender  
 23 – Year of birth 
 70 – Enrollment in school or kindergarten 
 721 – Total monthly household income; the total monthly household income from all 
work in the week of reference in the month of reference. Included in the household 
income is the income of all household members except the ones who were retired, a 
maid, relative of the maid or household members younger than 10 years.  
 745 – Family Type; used to estimate the variables Number of Parents and Number of 
children. 
 750 – Urban/Rural  
 764 – Number of household members; includes all the members in the household 
except members who were retired, a maid or relative of the maid.  
 766 – Monthly household income per capita; Variable 721 divided by variable 764.  
 
The following variables are recoded into dummy variables: 
1. Gender: 1=female, 0=male 
2. School enrollment: 1=yes, 0=no 
3. Urban/Rural: 1=urban, 0=rural 
4. State: one dummy variable per state   
4.2 Interviews 
The second part of the data in this paper contains information of the interviews with 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of Bolsa Família15. The interviews were carried out in 
several favelas in the municipality of Florianópolis. The aim of this data set is to develop the 
more general results from the econometric estimation in the first part of this paper, i.e. 
qualifying quantitative data as a tool for analysis. The interviews include ten families, six that 
receive Bolsa Família and four that do not. Through the interviews in Florianópolis, the 
intention is to expand and deepen the understanding of Bolsa Família, the direct and indirect 
effects of the program on the beneficiaries as well as the beneficiaries’ and non-beneficiaries’ 
opinion about the program. The selection of the families is not based on their monthly 
                                                        
14 See Appendix 3 
15 For interview questions, see Appendix 4 
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household income per capita as the selection of the data in the quantitative estimation. 
Therefore the interviewed families might not be representative for the families in the 
quantitative estimation.  
 
Five beneficiaries were selected from each CRAS. The interviews were completed in the 
homes of the beneficiaries, together and with help from the social assistants at the local office. 
Thanks to the knowledge of the social assistants, and the knowledge about the beneficiaries, 
the refusal rate for the interviews was zero. The social assistants also helped to explain and 
deepen the interview questions and answers when there were misunderstandings because of 
the language. Considerations were given to the situation of the respondent, with the result that 
not all questions were answered in the interviews.  
 
One possible bias that needs to be considered in the interviews is that the respondents might 
not have been completely honest in their answers regarding income and what they spend the 
grant on when the social assistants took part in the interviews, because they were afraid of 
losing the grant. However, the decision was taken that it was better that the social assistants 
participated in the interviews because of possible lack of communication due to linguistic 
faults.  
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5 Method 
 
This chapter develops the method used in the study. In order to answer the research question 
multi-strategy research, including an econometric estimation as well as interviews, has been 
conducted. The method used to analyze the quantitative data is a regression discontinuity 
model.   
 
5.1 Research Strategy 
The estimation in this thesis will be conducted through multi-strategy research. First, a 
quantitative analysis will be made to evaluate the possible differences between the 
beneficiaries and the non-beneficiaries; second, a qualitative analysis will be conducted to 
complement the estimation. The quantitative analysis will be conducted through a regression 
discontinuity design and the qualitative analysis will be conducted through semi-structured 
interviews.   
 
Table 5.1 Research Strategy 
Research Methods Data Elicitation Data Analysis 
Quantitative PNAD2011 
Regression discontinuity 
estimation 
Qualitative 
Semi-structured, face-to-face 
interviews 
Coding, Content analysis 
 
5.2 Regression Discontinuity 
When evaluating the effects of Bolsa Família on school enrollment among children in the 
families receiving the grant, a natural experiment is carried out because the subject of 
evaluation is an already existing program and not an experiment. However, Bolsa Família was 
not randomly implemented and therefore a clear natural experiment is not possible, since it 
would be considered unethical to have a real control group in this case when eligible 
individuals would have been out of treatment because of the evaluation. Therefore, a control 
group has to be created and hence a quasi-natural experiment is carried out. By measuring the 
average treatment effect, the problem that the same individual cannot both receive and not 
receive the treatment at the same time is avoided. The most common method to deal with this 
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is a difference in difference method. In this case, data of before and after the treatment for 
both the treated and non-treated individuals are not available and therefore a difference-in-
difference estimation is not possible (Verbeek, 2008). To answer the research question of this 
paper, a regression discontinuity estimation is carried out since the condition in order to be 
eligible for Bolsa Família is to receive less than 140 BRL a month per capita in the household. 
A regression discontinuity design is an effective way of measuring the average treatment 
effect, since the design takes advantage of the threshold of 140 BRL and uses a certain 
bandwidth from the threshold to identify a treatment group, just below 140 BRL, and a 
control group, just above 140 BRL. In this way the design allows for a distinction of a 
treatment group and a control group without keeping individuals, that otherwise would 
receive the treatment, out of treatment (Web Center for Social Research Methods, 2013-03-
04). Hence, comparing the treatment group and the control group will give the treatment 
effect. The design has not been commonly used in social science, mostly because it was 
developed as late as the mid-1970s. The advantage with the regression discontinuity design is 
that it usually provides strong internal validity and therefore gives valid results (Web Center 
for Social Research Methods, 2013-03-04).  
 
The econometric specification follows the one specified by Imbens and Lemiux (2007). Y0 
denotes the outcome without exposure to treatment and Y1 denotes the outcome if exposed to 
treatment, Y1 – Y0 is the primary interest of the study. Wi equals 1 if individual i is exposed to 
treatment and Wi equals 0 if individual i is not exposed to treatment. This can be set up as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖 = (1 − 𝑊𝑖) ∗ 𝑌𝑖(0) + 𝑊𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑖(1) = {
𝑌𝑖(0) 𝑖𝑓 𝑊𝑖 = 0
𝑌𝑖(1) 𝑖𝑓 𝑊𝑖 = 1
 
  (5.1) 
Where Yi denotes school enrollment and Wi indicates if the family receives Bolsa Família.  
 
Bolsa Família has a strict threshold, the individuals who earn between 0 and 140 BRL, are 
eligible for the grant, while individuals who earn 141 BRL or more are not eligible for the 
grant. Hence, a sharp regression discontinuity design is used for the estimation.  
 
𝑊𝑖 = 1{𝑋1 ≤ 𝑐} 
  (5.2) 
Where X denotes monthly household income per capita and c denotes the threshold of 140 
BRL. 
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In a regression discontinuity design the conditional expectation of the outcome given the 
covariate is examined, implying that what is examined is the expected value of a variable 
given a conditional probability distribution when the covariate equals a specific value. The 
conditional probability distribution is the probability that Y happens when X takes a specific 
value. In this case the purpose is to examine the discontinuity in the expected value of the 
children’s school enrollment given that the family receives Bolsa Família.  
 
lim
x↑c
𝔼[Yi|Xi = x] − lim
x↓c
𝔼[Yi|Xi = x] 
        (5.3) 
 
Therefore the average treatment effect can be specified as follows: 
 
 
τSRD = 𝔼[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Xi = c] 
  (5.4) 
                               
 
Equation 5.3 specifies the discontinuity in the conditional expected value of the output (Y) 
when the monthly household income per capita (X) equals the value x in both the treatment 
and the control group. Therefore, equation 5.4 shows the average causal treatment effect of 
the program, since it indicates the conditional expectation of the difference in school 
enrollment between the individuals receiving Bolsa Família and the individuals that do not 
receive it when the monthly household income per capita equals 140 BRL.  
 
Since the design of the model indicates that there are no individuals in the control group that 
have a monthly household income per capita of 140 BRL, one of the basic assumptions of 
matching-type estimators is violated since the units do not overlap. Therefore, an estimation 
of the unknown values by extrapolation might be necessary. An extrapolation will increase 
the uncertainty of the results and since the sample is large this uncertainty will be avoided by 
considering the average treatment effect when the monthly household income is close to 140 
BRL, instead of using extrapolation. 
 
τSRD = 𝔼[Y(1) − Y(0)|X = c] =  𝔼[Y(1)|X = c] − 𝔼[Y(0)|X = c]   
   (5.5) 
 
Accordingly, what is observed is the treatment effect when the monthly household income is 
close to 140 BRL.  There are no observations for the control group when the monthly income 
is exactly 140 BRL because the design of the method does not allow for it. Hence, some 
 29 
assumptions about smoothness have to be considered to assure the continuity of both the 
conditional regression functions and conditional distribution functions.  
 
The study is based upon the assumptions that the individuals in the treatment and control 
group are as similar as possible, therefore local linear regression is used. This suggests that 
linear regression functions are run only on data close to the threshold.  
 
For the treatment group the function is specified as follows: 
 
min
𝛼1𝛽1
∑ (𝑌𝑖 − 𝛼1 − 𝛽1 ∗ (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐))
2
𝑖:𝑐−ℎ<𝑋𝑖<𝑐
 
  (5.6) 
 
While the following function is specified for the control group: 
 
min
𝛼𝑟𝛽𝑟
∑ (𝑌𝑖 − 𝛼𝑟 − 𝛽𝑟 ∗ (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑐))
2
𝑖:𝑐≤𝑋𝑖<𝑐+ℎ
 
    (5.7) 
In order to complete the local linear regression, the standard least squares method is used. The 
average is then measured as: 
 
𝜇1(𝑐) = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 ∗ (𝑐 − 𝑐) = 𝛼1         
 (5.8) 
and 
 
𝜇𝑟(𝑐) = 𝛼𝑟 + 𝛽𝑟 ∗ (𝑐 − 𝑐) = 𝛼𝑟 
   (5.9)  
The average treatment effect is then estimated as:   
𝜏𝑆𝑅𝐷 = 𝛼1 − 𝛼𝑟    
(5.10) 
The bandwidth, h, is chosen according to Imbens and Lemieux (2007). Since a standard least 
square method is used for inference, the optimal bandwidth is calculated as ℎ ∝ 𝑁−1/5. As the 
sample contains 74 590 individuals the optimal bandwidth is 14.8 BRL. To check for 
robustness in the result, different bandwidths are tested.  
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The exact regression used to estimate the impact of Bolsa Família on school enrollment is 
specified as follows: 
 
𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑎𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽5𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀 
    (5.11) 
Where: 
Y = A dummy variable that represents whether the individual is enrolled in school or not 
Bolsa Família = A dummy variable that denotes whether the individual receive Bolsa Família 
or not 
Gender = A dummy variable that controls for gender specific differences 
Parents = A dummy variable that controls for differences depending on if the individual lives 
with one or two parents. 
Urban = A dummy variable that controls for differences between urban and rural areas 
Children = A dummy variable that controls for differences in how many children live in the 
household 
State = A dummy variable that controls for state specific differences 
Income= Controls for the monthly household income 
5.3 Interviews 
The case study interviews are conducted through semi-structured, in-depth interviews. The 
interviews are non-standardized, also known as qualitative research interviews, in order to 
qualify the results obtained through the quantitative estimation, as well as to explore in-depth 
the subject discussed in the thesis. 
 
In the semi-structures interviews, a list of questions and themes are used in order to make sure 
all relevant topics are covered. Hence, the questions may vary from interview to interview, 
since the respondents have different characteristics and it therefore is necessary to have more 
extensive questions (Saunders et al., 2009). The interviews are conducted through face-to-face 
interviews, held in the home of the respondent and the language used is Portuguese. After 
discussing the construction of the questions with the social assistants at the CRAS, the 
decision was taken that structured interviews or self-completion forms will not be used, 
because of the high level of illiteracy among the beneficiaries. It is also important to consider 
the sensitivity of the answers that are related to poverty and participation in the grant 
program, and because of this, face-to-face interviews are believed to give more truthful 
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answers and increase the response rate. The data is collected and recorded, in order to reduce 
the risk for misunderstanding, and then transcribed, rewritten and translated from Portuguese 
to English.  
 
Hence, the interviews are semi-structured and the order of the questions might be altered, 
depending on the responses by the interviewee and the course of the conversation. The 
respondent are also given the opportunity to answer the questions more freely in order to 
describe certain events, behavior, opinions and thoughts, known as non-directive interaction. 
Even though the respondents are able to answer the questions reasonably unreservedly, some 
questions in the interview have the form of an interviewer-administered questionnaire. An 
example of such a question might be “monthly grant from Bolsa Família”. 
 
 
  
 32 
6 Results 
 
The following chapter presents the results from the quantitative estimation and the qualitative 
evaluation. First, the econometric analysis will be presented and analyzed followed by a 
presentation of the results from the interviews and a conclusion of the same.  
 
6.1 Quantitative Estimation 
The following session presents the results from the empirical estimation made in this study. 
6.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Presented below are descriptive statistics of (a) the entire sample from PNAD2011 with the 
individuals born 1993-2004, (b) the individuals in the sample who receive Bolsa Família, and 
(c) the sample used in the estimation, i.e. born 1993-2004 with a monthly household income 
of 126-155 BRL.  
 
Figure 6.1 Distribution of Monthly Household Income per capita of all Individuals Born Between 1993-
2004 
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the income dispersion of the individuals included in the household 
survey who are born between 1993 and 2004 with a monthly household income per capita 
from 0 to 4000 BRL. The sample consists of 67 463 individuals. Most individuals have a 
monthly household income per capita of somewhere between 0-1000 BRL. The average 
household income per capita is just above 450 BRL. This implies that the average level of 
income is below the minimum wage. In the graph the extreme values above 4000 BRL are 
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excluded in order to make the result more visible. The following graph illustrates the monthly 
household income distribution among the individuals receiving Bolsa Família included in the 
household survey and born 1993-2003. 
 
Figure 6.2 Distribution of Monthly Household Income per capita of Beneficiaries of Bolsa Família 
 
The above graph shows a fairly even income distribution among the individuals receiving 
Bolsa Família. Most individuals earn more than 70 BRL, which implies that they are not 
considered extremely poor. At some income levels, there are certain peaks, which could imply 
that these peaks characterize the minimum wage divided into different numbers of household 
members, since many beneficiaries receive the minimum wage. An interesting result of this 
graph is the peak just below 140 BRL, which also can be seen in the next graph where the 
income distribution of the total sample in the estimation, i.e. individuals born 1993-2004 with 
a monthly household income per capita between 126 and 155 BRL, is illustrated. 
 
Figure 6.3 Distribution of Monthly Household Income per capita of the Individuals in the Estimation 
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The graph above shows that most of the individuals have a monthly household income per 
capita between 130 and 150 BRL. The clear peak at 136 BRL is highly likely to occur since 
136 BRL is approximately one fourth of the minimum wage (545 BRL). The average monthly 
household income per capita is around 140 BRL, which is further presented in the following 
table. 
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of Total Sample 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
 School Enrollment 4677 0 1 0,93 0,248 
Bolsa Família 4677 0 1 0,52 0,500 
Gender 4677 0 1 0,49 0,500 
Year of Birth 4677 1993 2004 1998 3,291 
Monthly Household Income p.c.  4677 126 155 140,74 8,115 
Number of Household Members 4677 2 14 5,30 1,642 
Number of Parents 4677 1 2 1,79 0,406 
Number of Children 4677 0 13 3,51 1,635 
Urban 4677 0 1 0,74 0,441 
Valid N  4677     
 
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics of all the individuals in the sample. The sample is 
based upon 4 677 individual observations and only includes individuals born 1993-2004. 93% 
of the individuals in the sample are enrolled in school, while 52% of the individuals receive 
Bolsa Família. 49% of the individuals are women. The average monthly household income of 
the sample is 140.74 BRL. 74% of the sample lives in urban areas.  
 
Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Treatment Group 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
School Enrollment 2411 0 1 0,93 0,260 
Bolsa Família 2411 1 1 1,00 0,000 
Gender 2411 0 1 0,49 0,500 
Year of Birth 2411 1993 2004 1998,74 3,304 
Monthly Household Income p. c.  2411 126 140 133,98 3,887 
Number of Household Members 2411 2 12 5,26 1,630 
Number of Parents 2411 1 2 1,79 0,406 
Number of Children 2411 0 10 3,47 1,624 
Urban 2411 0 1 0,75 0,436 
Valid N 2411 
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Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the individuals in the sample that do receive 
Bolsa Família. The treatment group consists of 2411 individuals with an average monthly 
household income of 133.98 BRL. The average number of children in the families is 3.47. 
75% of the individuals in the treatment group live in an urban area. 
 
Table 6.3 Descriptive Statistics Control Group 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
School Enrollment 2266 0 1 0,94 0,235 
Bolsa Família 2266 0 0 0,00 0,000 
Gender 2266 0 1 0,48 0,500 
Year of Birth 2266 1993 2004 1998,88 3,277 
Monthly Household Income p.c. 2266 141 155 147,93 4,419 
Number of Household Members 2266 2 14 5,34 1,653 
Number of Parents 2266 1 2 1,79 0,406 
Number of Children 2266 0 13 3,55 1,645 
Urban 2266 0 1 0,73 0,446 
Valid N  2266     
 
The above table contains the descriptive statistics for the control group, which consists of 
2266 individuals. The average household income per capita is 147.93 BRL. The average 
number of children is 3.55, which is slightly above the average number of children in the 
families in the treatment group. 73% of the individuals live in an urban area. 
 
For the regression discontinuity design to be valid, it is important that the treatment and the 
control groups are as similar as possible. This can be tested through examining the descriptive 
statistics. The treatment and control group appear to have similar characteristics when it 
comes to the variables included in the estimation. 
 
Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics of School Enrollment 
  N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
School Enrollment (Entire Sample) 4677 0 1 0,93 0,248 
School Enrollment (Entire, Primary) 3742 0 1 0,98 0,153 
School Enrollment (Entire, Secondary) 935 0 1 0,77 0,424 
School Enrollment (Treatment Group) 2411 0 1 0,93 0,26 
School Enrollment (Treatment, Primary) 1913 0 1 0,97 0,161 
School Enrollment (Treatment, Secondary) 498 0 1 0,75 0,434 
School Enrollment (Control Group) 2266 0 1 0,94 0,235 
School Enrollment (Control, Primary) 1829 0 1 0,98 0,144 
School Enrollment (Control, Secondary) 437 0 1 0,78 0,411 
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In the above table the descriptive statistics of school enrollment for different groups of the 
sample is presented. The most interesting result is the difference in school enrollment between 
the students in primary and secondary school for both the treatment and the control group. It 
seems to be lower school enrollment among the older individuals i.e. the teenagers. This 
result is interesting since secondary school is not mandatory but primary school is.   
6.1.2 Correlation Analysis 
Below follows a simple analysis of the relationships between the variables used in the 
estimations. The main focus is on the relationship between the dependent variable school 
enrollment and the independent variable receiving Bolsa Família.  
 
Table 6.5 Correlations 
 
 School 
Enrollment 
Bolsa 
Família 
Gender Year of 
Birth 
Monthly 
Household 
Income p.c. 
Number of 
Household 
Members 
Number of 
Parents 
Number of 
Children 
Urban 
School Enrollment  0,029* 0,027 -0,291** -0,011 0,008 -0,048** 0,020 0,003 
Bolsa Família  0,029*  0,014 -0,022 -0,859** -0,026 0,001 -0,027 -0,015 
Gender  0,027 0,014  -0,039** -0,010 0,003 0,000 0,003 -0,028 
Year of Birth  -0,291** -0,022 -0,039**  -0,005 0,009 0,052** -0,004 0,004 
Monthly Household Income p.c.  -0,011 -0,859** -0,010 -0,005  -0,033 -0,010 -0,031* 0,010 
Number of Household Members  0,008 -0,026 0,003 0,009 -0,033  0,142** 0,969** 0,091** 
Number of Parents  -0,048** 0,001 0,000 0,052** -0,010 0,142**       -0,106** 0,168** 
Number of Children  0,020 -0,027 0,003 -0,004 -0,031* 0,969** -0,106**  0,050** 
Urban  0,003 -0,015 -0,028 0,004 0,010 0,091** 0,168** 0,000  
a. Listwise N=4677 
b. Pearson Correlation 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
The majority of the variables are weakly correlated to each other. The correlation values are 
close to zero, which indicate that there is almost no correlation between the variables. 
Receiving Bolsa Família is slightly positively correlated with school enrollment but the low 
value of correlation implies that no certain conclusion can be drawn. However, this 
relationship will be further examined in the following part of this chapter.  
6.1.3 Scatter Plot 
In order to get a general overview of the relationship between receiving Bolsa Família and 
monthly household income per capita, a scatter plot is presented. If there is a discontinuity in 
the regression around the threshold, this should be visible in a scatter plot. 
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Figure 6.4 Relationship between Bolsa Família and Monthly Household Income per capita 
 
 
As the graph above shows, the individuals receiving Bolsa Família have a monthly household 
income per capita of less than 140 BRL. If the household income per capita increases to more 
than 140 BRL, the family is not eligible for Bolsa Família. In the graph, a clear “jump” 
between the beneficiaries and the non-beneficiaries is visible.  
6.1.4 Regression Analysis 
In order to estimate if Bolsa Família has any effects on school enrollment, a multiple linear 
regression estimation is made and presented in the following section. The analysis is made 
twice, first for all individuals aged 7-18 and then for all individuals in the age 16-18, i.e. 
teenagers. The analysis of the teenagers is carried out in order to test if there is a difference in 
school enrollment between primary and secondary school. Secondary school is not mandatory 
in Brazil, in contrast to primary school. This indicates that Bolsa Família might have a bigger 
effect on school enrollment for individuals in secondary school since it is no longer 
mandatory for the student to attend school.   
6.1.4.1 Multiple Linear Regression 
A multiple linear regression is used to establish whether receiving Bolsa Família has any 
effect on schooling or not. 
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Table 6.6 Regression Analysis of Entire Sample 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 1,032 0,046  22,592 0,000 
Bolsa Família -0,025 0,008 -0,050 -3,215 0,001 
Monthly Household Income 0,000 0,000 -0,120 -4,456 0,000 
dum_gender -0,014 0,007 -0,028 -1,916 0,055 
dum_parents1 0,049 0,010 0,080 4,940 0,000 
dum_urban 0,007 0,009 0,012 0,792 0,429 
dum_children1 -0,113 0,025 -0,089 -4,460 0,000 
dum_children2 -0,069 0,016 -0,116 -4,416 0,000 
dum_children3 -0,027 0,012 -0,051 -2,217 0,027 
dum_rodônia 0,036 0,041 0,023 0,862 0,389 
dum_acre -0,003 0,044 -0,002 -0,074 0,941 
dum_amazonas 0,000 0,038 0,000 -0,010 0,992 
dum_roraima 0,038 0,048 0,017 0,796 0,426 
dum_pará 0,009 0,036 0,010 0,238 0,812 
dum_amapá -0,008 0,044 -0,004 -0,176 0,861 
dum_tocantins 0,022 0,042 0,013 0,529 0,597 
dum_maranhao -0,012 0,039 -0,010 -0,315 0,752 
dum_piauí 0,002 0,042 0,001 0,046 0,964 
dum_ceará 0,017 0,037 0,018 0,468 0,640 
dum_riograndedonorte -0,045 0,042 -0,027 -1,071 0,284 
dum_paraíba 0,034 0,040 0,024 0,837 0,403 
dum_pernambuco -0,015 0,037 -0,017 -0,397 0,691 
dum_alagoas -0,059 0,040 -0,042 -1,464 0,143 
dum_sergipe 0,038 0,042 0,024 0,915 0,360 
dum_bahia 0,005 0,036 0,007 0,145 0,884 
dum_minasgerais 0,008 0,037 0,008 0,210 0,834 
dum_espíritosantos 0,052 0,049 0,022 1,068 0,286 
dum_riodejaneiro -0,015 0,039 -0,012 -0,385 0,700 
dum_saopaulo -0,006 0,039 -0,005 -0,154 0,877 
dum_paraná -0,015 0,043 -0,008 -0,335 0,738 
dum_santacatarina -0,048 0,051 -0,018 -0,940 0,347 
dum_riograndedosul 0,008 0,039 0,006 0,203 0,839 
dum_matogrossodosul 0,027 0,057 0,009 0,476 0,634 
dum_matogrosso 0,050 0,045 0,025 1,101 0,271 
dum_goiás 0,009 0,041 0,006 0,207 0,836 
 
 
Table 6.6 presents the results from a multiple linear regression on the effects of Bolsa Família 
on school enrollment. The estimation shows that receiving Bolsa Família has a negative 
impact on school enrollment. The p-value is 0.001, and therefore the result is statistically 
significant. Considering the other significant results, it is positive to have one parent and it is 
also positive to live in an urban area. Since dummy variables are included in the equation, the 
dummy variables will cancel out if both options are included in the regression at the same 
time. Therefore, the variables are excluded in the first regression. The result of the effect of 
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Bolsa Família on school enrollment remains the same in the second regression16. To further 
test the result an analysis of the school enrollment among the teenagers is carried out. 
 
Table 6.7 Regression Analysis of Individuals Born 1993-1995 
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 1,047 0,171  6,113 0,000 
Bolsa Família -0,059 0,029 -0,070 -2,026 0,043 
Monthly Household Income 0,000 0,000 -0,196 -3,071 0,002 
dum_gender -0,078 0,028 -0,092 -2,789 0,005 
dum_parents1 0,111 0,036 0,113 3,038 0,002 
dum_urban 0,025 0,034 0,025 0,725 0,469 
dum_children1 -0,282 0,091 -0,150 -3,103 0,002 
dum_children2 -0,169 0,060 -0,174 -2,810 0,005 
dum_children3 -0,082 0,047 -0,090 -1,738 0,083 
dum_rodônia 0,123 0,150 0,049 0,816 0,415 
dum_acre -0,154 0,165 -0,047 -0,931 0,352 
dum_amazonas 0,101 0,141 0,052 0,716 0,474 
dum_roraima 0,068 0,191 0,016 0,355 0,723 
dum_pará 0,068 0,135 0,047 0,506 0,613 
dum_amapá -0,090 0,170 -0,026 -0,529 0,597 
dum_tocantins 0,047 0,160 0,016 0,293 0,770 
dum_maranhao -0,020 0,142 -0,010 -0,143 0,886 
dum_piauí -0,046 0,155 -0,017 -0,297 0,767 
dum_ceará 0,072 0,136 0,047 0,529 0,597 
dum_riograndedonorte -0,064 0,155 -0,024 -0,415 0,678 
dum_paraíba 0,183 0,148 0,079 1,241 0,215 
dum_pernambuco -0,052 0,135 -0,036 -0,383 0,702 
dum_alagoas -0,091 0,148 -0,039 -0,617 0,537 
dum_sergipe 0,089 0,161 0,030 0,556 0,579 
dum_bahia 0,017 0,133 0,013 0,129 0,898 
dum_minasgerais -0,007 0,139 -0,004 -0,051 0,959 
dum_espíritosantos 0,106 0,204 0,022 0,521 0,603 
dum_riodejaneiro -0,019 0,142 -0,009 -0,135 0,893 
dum_saopaulo -0,045 0,149 -0,018 -0,299 0,765 
dum_paraná 0,074 0,163 0,023 0,453 0,650 
dum_santacatarina -0,224 0,190 -0,052 -1,176 0,240 
dum_riograndedosul -0,014 0,145 -0,007 -0,099 0,921 
dum_matogrossodosul 0,076 0,228 0,013 0,332 0,740 
dum_matogrosso 0,211 0,177 0,056 1,196 0,232 
dum_goiás 0,002 0,154 0,001 0,012 0,990 
 
 
Table 6.7 presents the result from a multiple linear regression on the effects of Bolsa Família 
on school enrollment for individuals born between 1993 and 1995, i.e. individuals assumed to 
attend secondary, non-statutory school. Hence, this indicates that the result is negative, which 
implies that receiving Bolsa Família has a negative impact on school enrollment even for the 
individuals born between 1993 and 1995. The result is statistically significant. The same 
result is achieved when including the excluded dummy variables17.  
                                                        
16 For further information see appendix 5 
17 For further information see appendix 6 
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6.1.5 Alternative Test 
To test the results above, an estimation with a smaller bandwidth is carried out. The new 
sample consists of all individuals with a monthly household income per capita between 131 
and 150 BRL. This excludes the individuals further away from the threshold and this is 
assumed to diminish the eventual difference between the treatment and the control group. 
 
Table 6.8 Regression Analysis with Smaller Bandwidth of Entire Sample 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 0,987 0,054  18,425 0,000 
Bolsa Família -0,026 0,009 -0,053 -2,990 0,003 
Monthly Household Income 0,000 0,000 -0,113 -3,586 0,000 
dum_gender -0,013 0,008 -0,027 -1,577 0,115 
dum_parents1 0,045 0,012 0,073 3,869 0,000 
dum_urban 0,018 0,010 0,032 1,811 0,070 
dum_children1 -0,141 0,029 -0,112 -4,794 0,000 
dum_children2 -0,069 0,018 -0,118 -3,732 0,000 
dum_children3 -0,023 0,014 -0,045 -1,651 0,099 
dum_rodônia 0,087 0,048 0,058 1,830 0,067 
dum_acre 0,042 0,053 0,021 0,804 0,421 
dum_amazonas 0,050 0,044 0,046 1,133 0,257 
dum_roraima 0,089 0,054 0,043 1,654 0,098 
dum_pará 0,059 0,043 0,073 1,392 0,164 
dum_amapá 0,015 0,052 0,008 0,290 0,771 
dum_tocantins 0,051 0,050 0,030 1,022 0,307 
dum_maranhao 0,017 0,045 0,014 0,377 0,706 
dum_piauí 0,027 0,050 0,015 0,541 0,588 
dum_ceará 0,044 0,044 0,046 1,012 0,311 
dum_riograndedonorte 0,005 0,048 0,003 0,102 0,918 
dum_paraíba 0,086 0,047 0,061 1,834 0,067 
dum_pernambuco 0,012 0,043 0,014 0,286 0,775 
dum_alagoas -0,040 0,047 -0,028 -0,840 0,401 
dum_sergipe 0,081 0,049 0,049 1,636 0,102 
dum_bahia 0,034 0,042 0,043 0,796 0,426 
dum_minasgerais 0,061 0,044 0,062 1,383 0,167 
dum_espíritosantos 0,076 0,056 0,034 1,373 0,170 
dum_riodejaneiro 0,016 0,046 0,013 0,359 0,720 
dum_saopaulo 0,028 0,046 0,022 0,614 0,539 
dum_paraná 0,001 0,052 0,001 0,026 0,979 
dum_santacatarina -0,037 0,058 -0,015 -0,637 0,524 
dum_riograndedosul 0,041 0,046 0,033 0,901 0,368 
dum_matogrossodosul 0,056 0,066 0,018 0,852 0,394 
dum_matogrosso 0,100 0,054 0,047 1,835 0,067 
dum_goiás 0,030 0,047 0,020 0,633 0,526 
 
 
The p-value of 0.003 indicates that the result is statistically significant, which implies that 
receiving Bolsa Família has a small, but negative impact on school enrollment. The result of 
this estimation matches the result in the estimation in table 6.8 and shows a slightly bigger 
effect than the estimation with the wider bandwidth. The positive effect on school enrollment 
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of having one parent is also consistent. The robustness of the results is further analyzed by an 
estimation of the individuals born 1993 to 1995 and with a monthly household income 
between 131 and 150. There is no difference in the result from the test with the excluded 
variables18.  
 
Table 6.9 Regression Analysis with Smaller Bandwidth of Individuals Born 1993-1995 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 0,959 0,190  5,055 0,000 
Bolsa Família -0,070 0,035 -0,081 -1,995 0,046 
Monthly Household Income 0,000 0,000 -0,173 -2,331 0,020 
dum_gender -0,084 0,033 -0,098 -2,525 0,012 
dum_parents1 0,114 0,043 0,113 2,638 0,009 
dum_urban 0,061 0,041 0,061 1,490 0,137 
dum_children1 -0,357 0,107 -0,188 -3,340 0,001 
dum_children2 -0,158 0,071 -0,166 -2,241 0,025 
dum_children3 -0,060 0,057 -0,065 -1,059 0,290 
dum_rodônia 0,231 0,163 0,094 1,420 0,156 
dum_acre -0,098 0,196 -0,026 -0,498 0,619 
dum_amazonas 0,130 0,149 0,072 0,873 0,383 
dum_roraima 0,192 0,211 0,046 0,912 0,362 
dum_pará 0,161 0,145 0,108 1,115 0,265 
dum_amapá -0,087 0,178 -0,028 -0,489 0,625 
dum_tocantins 0,042 0,184 0,013 0,231 0,817 
dum_maranhao 0,007 0,153 0,004 0,048 0,962 
dum_piauí -0,140 0,186 -0,041 -0,754 0,451 
dum_ceará 0,079 0,145 0,051 0,544 0,587 
dum_riograndedonorte -0,007 0,163 -0,003 -0,041 0,967 
dum_paraíba 0,285 0,162 0,118 1,765 0,078 
dum_pernambuco -0,054 0,144 -0,036 -0,374 0,709 
dum_alagoas -0,175 0,162 -0,073 -1,083 0,279 
dum_sergipe 0,131 0,183 0,041 0,719 0,473 
dum_bahia 0,021 0,142 0,016 0,147 0,883 
dum_minasgerais 0,090 0,151 0,049 0,598 0,550 
dum_espíritosantos 0,102 0,217 0,022 0,469 0,640 
dum_riodejaneiro 0,032 0,154 0,015 0,208 0,835 
dum_saopaulo 0,014 0,158 0,006 0,088 0,930 
dum_paraná 0,082 0,174 0,027 0,473 0,637 
dum_santacatarina -0,332 0,210 -0,079 -1,584 0,114 
dum_riograndedosul 0,017 0,156 0,008 0,109 0,913 
dum_matogrossodosul 0,135 0,252 0,024 0,536 0,592 
dum_matogrosso 0,223 0,201 0,056 1,108 0,268 
dum_goiás -0,020 0,164 -0,008 -0,125 0,901 
 
The result in the table above is still significant and the result follows the other estimations and 
shows a negative result for the effects of Bolsa Família on school enrollment. Testing for the 
excluded dummy variables yields the same result19. 
                                                        
18 For further information see appendix 7 
19 For further information see appendix 8 
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6.1.5.1 Testing the Results 
To obtain an unbiased result when using the ordinary least square regression model, it is 
important that the standard errors are homoscedastic, i.e. the variance is constant in the 
sample. If there is heterogeneity in the result, the standard errors estimates will be 
inconsistent. In order to reduce the risk for heteroscedasticity in the result, White’s 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used, and the estimation gives the results as 
in table 6.10. The model does not presume homoscedasticity, but this method reduces the 
effects of heteroscedasticity on OLS-estimates. The results of the coefficients from table 6.6 
appear to still be significant after running the regression with White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors.  
 
Table 6.10 White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance 
 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t Sig.   
     
     C(1) 0.989984 0.051408 19.25725 0.0000 
C(2) Bolsa Família -0.024583 0.008016 -3.066600 0.0022 
C(3) Gender -0.013892 0.007288 -1.906152 0.0567 
C(4) Urban -0.006766 0.008634 -0.783643 0.4333 
C(5) Number of Parents 0.048904 0.011397 4.290856 0.0000 
C(6) Children 1 -0.113163 0.030806 -3.673459 0.0002 
C(7) Children 2 -0.069344 0.016903 -4.102547 0.0000 
C(8) Children 3 -0.026713 0.011955 -2.234405 0.0255 
C(9) Acre  0.035588 0.041522 0.857083 0.3914 
C(10) Amazonas -0.003263 0.048007 -0.067980 0.9458 
C(11) Roraima -0.000392 0.041609 -0.009430 0.9925 
C(12) Pará 0.037940 0.045397 0.835733 0.4033 
C(13) Amapá 0.008684 0.039480 0.219953 0.8259 
C(14) Tocantins -0.007713 0.048666 -0.158496 0.8741 
C(15) Maranhão 0.022262 0.043346 0.513580 0.6076 
C(16) Piauí -0.012157 0.042273 -0.287582 0.7737 
C(17) Ceará 0.001910 0.044693 0.042726 0.9659 
C(18) Rio Grande do Norte 0.017340 0.039836 0.435289 0.6634 
C(19) Paraíba -0.045049 0.048734 -0.924379 0.3553 
C(20) Pernambuco 0.033682 0.041517 0.811275 0.4172 
C(21) Alagoas -0.014586 0.040362 -0.361380 0.7178 
C(22) Sergipe -0.058541 0.046386 -1.262036 0.2070 
C(23) Bahia 0.038249 0.041058 0.931563 0.3516 
C(24) Minas Gerais 0.005266 0.039520 0.133254 0.8940 
C(25) Espírito Santos 0.007787 0.040228 0.193574 0.8465 
C(26) Rio de Janeiro 0.051830 0.042255 1.226614 0.2200 
C(27) São Paulo -0.014979 0.042790 -0.350062 0.7263 
C(28) Paraná -0.006077 0.042846 -0.141837 0.8872 
C(29) Santa Catarina -0.014553 0.047747 -0.304793 0.7605 
C(30) Rio Grande do Sul -0.048373 0.062916 -0.768854 0.4420 
C(31) Mato Grosso do Sul 0.007938 0.042098 0.188560 0.8504 
C(32) Mato Grosso 0.027101 0.050420 0.537512 0.5909 
C(33) Goiás 0.049643 0.040548 1.224296 0.2209 
C(34) Distrito Federal 0.008513 0.043974 0.193586 0.8465 
C(35) Monthly Household Income -0.000128 3.57E-05 -3.581809 0.0003 
     
     Dependent variable: DUM_SE Sample: 1-4677       Included observations: 4665     
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There is a risk of increased overall sampling error, since as a first step, the total sample was 
divided into the individuals born 1993-2004 and all others. Then the subgroup 1993-2004 was 
divided into another cluster consisting of the individuals earning 126-155 BRL and all others. 
When comparing data on different levels there is a risk that the standard errors are correlated 
within one level. In this case, there is a risk that the standard errors are correlated on the 
household level if two individuals from the same household are included in the sample. Since 
one of the basic assumptions for OLS is that the units are independent from each other this 
might give misleading results. If the units are dependent on each other, the standard errors are 
underestimated and the significance of the result is overestimated. In this case, many different 
households are included in the sample, the clusters are small and numerous, which entails that 
the risk of correlated standard errors should have a marginal impact on the results. A Ramsey 
RESET test was conducted in order to evaluate the empirical specification for non-linear 
omitted variables. The result of the test indicates that there might be omitted variables in the 
regression and it cannot be ruled out that these possibly omitted variables might affect the 
results.  
6.1.6 Summary of Results from Quantitative Estimation 
Bolsa Família has a small, but negative, effect on school enrollment. The result is significant 
for the entire sample, i.e. individuals born 1993-2004 as well as for the individuals born 1993-
1995. If the bandwidth is reduced, the negative result is larger and the result is more 
significant. The difference between the results from the smaller and the bigger bandwidth is 
small which implies that the results are robust. There is no essential difference in the result 
after conducting White’s Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors estimation, which 
also verifies that the results are robust. 
6.2 Interviews 
The following results are presented in the table in Appendix 9. 
6.2.1 Results from Interviews 
Ten mothers were selected for the interviews, six of them receive Bolsa Família and four of 
them do not receive Bolsa Família, due to not fulfilling the conditions. All the mothers asked 
to participate in the interviews accepted to be interviewed. How long the beneficiaries have 
received the grant, ranges from a couple of months to the whole duration of the program 
beginning in 2004 to February 2013. The majority of the mothers never had their grant 
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interrupted, i.e. five out of nine who responded to that question, while two mothers had the 
grant interrupted once before and one mother had the grant interrupted twice, all due to not 
meeting the conditions because the children did not attend school for various reasons.  
 
The average monthly grant is 138.5 BRL varying from 32 BRL (one child and no basic grant 
of 70 BRL) to 236 BRL (three children at 32 BRL, one child at 38 BRL, the basic grant of 70 
BRL, and an additional grant of 32 BRL). Six of the respondents state that the grant is not 
enough, while three of the respondents affirm that the grant helps a lot. The average number 
of children per family is 2.9 children, varying between one to six children. The average 
number of people living in the household is 4.5 people, ranging from two to seven people.  
 
Considering the characteristics of the respondents, three respondents had a permanent job, 
five a temporary job, one was retired and one did not work at all. Seven of the respondents 
had attended school up until elementary school, i.e. eight years, two had finished high school, 
either eleven or twelve years depending on which year they attended school, and one had 
finished fourth grade. 
 
The school enrollment among the children was high. There was only one child in school age 
that did not attend school, due to lack of interest from the child. Even though the families 
were blocked, the children in the blocked family continued attending school, and most 
children would have attended school even without receiving Bolsa Família, according to the 
mothers. When considering the school and kindergarten in Florianópolis, all schools offer 
classes five days a week. All of them offer snacks, and depending on whether the child attend 
school full day or just half day20, the school might serve lunch. When the child attends school 
the entire day, the school tends to offer lunch as well. It is obligatory to buy a school uniform, 
consisting of a t-shirt with the school emblem (12-20 BRL), and pants (approximately 80 
BRL). The majority of the interviewees find it hard to pay for the school uniform with five of 
them answering that they have not bought the school uniform since they find it too expensive. 
One woman says she has bought the t-shirt, but that she cannot afford the pants. Four women 
answer that they have bough the t-shirt but say that they believe that it is a very high cost for 
them. Eight children out of eleven have walking distance to school, while three have to take 
the bus. The municipality pays for the bus tickets for two of these children, while one mother 
                                                        
20 Half-day period is the most common in Brazilian schools. The student either attend the morning session between 
07:30 and 12:00, or the afternoon session, from 13:00 to 17:30 
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has to pay for the bus ticket. The average number of students per classroom is 33 students, 
ranging from 20 to 52 students per classroom. Two children had to retake a class, one of them 
three times, the other children never had to retake a class.  
 
According to five of nine mothers, the grant is in most cases used for the children and things 
for them, such as food, clothes, shoes, and bus tickets. Two declare that the grant is used for 
everything, and one of these says that the grant from Bolsa Família is the only income the 
family has. One gives the total grant to the student, who spends it on an Internet connection in 
the house. Three out of four declares that their living standard has increased since they started 
receiving Bolsa Família, while the fourth believes that the amount is not enough in order to 
increase the living standard. Six out of eight respondents believe it is socially accepted to 
receive the grant from Bolsa Família, while eight out of nine do not believe it is embarrassing 
to receive it. The ninth believes it is embarrassing to be a beneficiary of Bolsa Família.  
6.2.2 Summary of Results from Interviews 
The conclusion that can be drawn from these qualitative interviews is that the grant from 
Bolsa Família is of great help for the families. Most of the grant is spent on things for the 
children in order to make it easier for the children to attend school and to have a better life, 
which is one purpose of Bolsa Família, but the respondents also add that the children would 
have been enrolled in school even if they did not receive the grant from Bolsa Família. The 
problem most of the mothers mention is that the grant is not enough to change either their 
living standard or their living situation. The grant helps them with their daily lives and helps 
them to get out of misery, but it will not change the situation for the families.  
 
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the interviews is that the beneficiaries of Bolsa 
Família do not find it embarrassing to receive it and that other people do not have prejudices 
against the beneficiaries. Most of the interviewees believe it is socially accepted to receive the 
grant from Bolsa Família. The increased consciousness about the program, with more families 
applying for the grant, might lead to t more families becoming beneficiaries of the program, 
and therefore more children benefitting from the grant and increasing their assimilation of 
education.  
 
Finally, after discussions with the social assistants and the beneficiaries of the program, it is 
clear that the unblocking is time consuming and far-reaching, since it requires that the social 
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assistant pays a visit to the blocked person in order to sort out the reason for the blocking and 
how to solve the problem with the unfulfillment of the conditions. Given this, not fulfilling 
the conditions has a considerable effect for the families. In this sense, Bolsa Família could be 
a powerful tool to increase the incentives to stay in school for the children already enrolled in 
school. What also can be concluded is that Bolsa Família in these cases does not increase 
school enrollment since the children would have been enrolled even without the grant and the 
children from families that have been blocked still attend school.  
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7 Conclusion 
 
Lastly, a summary of the paper linking the conclusion with the introduction together with a 
conclusion of the results, as well as proposals for future studies. 
 
Since the 1980’s, the level of school enrollment among school-aged children has shown a 
strong and upward trend in Brazil. Even though most countries have experienced this positive 
trend, there is still a huge lack of education in many countries, Brazil included. Several 
theories and practices concerning this problem have arisen over the years. CCTs have 
throughout the years been recognized and established as an effective way to fight poverty and 
lack of schooling among children in poor families.  
 
The results from the quantitative estimation show that there is no significant evidence that 
receiving Bolsa Família increases school enrollment. Instead, receiving Bolsa Família has a 
significant but small negative impact on school enrollment for the entire sample of children 
born 1993-2004. Since school enrollment is rather high in Brazil, and primary school is 
mandatory, the conditionality on school enrollment might be redundant. The result for school 
enrollment among teenagers born 1993-1995 is also negative and significant.  
 
An explanation for this negative result could be lacking controls of the fulfillment of the 
conditionalities among the beneficiaries. If the controls are poorly administrated, there might 
be a group of students that systematically skip school. The income benefits might be bigger 
than the risk of getting caught cheating if the controls are sporadic. If this is the case, 
receiving Bolsa Família has a negative impact on school enrollment. Since the money is not 
earmarked, the extra household income might be spent on other things than education and 
therefore not increase the incentives to send the children to school. For the families whose 
children do not attend school, the preferences for education is probably low and the 
conditionalities do not increase their incentives.  
 
Even though the quantitative estimation shows a negative effect on school enrollment, the 
qualitative research in this study shows an unmistakable trend – the grant from Bolsa Família 
is a direct poverty relief for the families, and it appears to have positive effects on other 
aspects of the beneficiaries’ lives. Even though the children in the families that were blocked 
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from Bolsa Família still attend school, the grant facilitates the lives of the families and 
schooling among the children, since the grant is used to pay for bus tickets, school uniform, 
food, clothes, and other vital items. Even though Bolsa Família might not be the solution to 
Brazil’s poverty problems, it could be one of many short-term solutions that will lead to a 
long-term reduction of poverty.   
 
The long-term effects of Bolsa Família, i.e. the third dimension of the purpose of helping the 
poor and extremely poor out of the poverty trap, is not completed since Bolsa Família does 
not increase school enrollment, i.e. the second dimension. According to the human capital 
theory, increased schooling leads to increased earnings in the future. Since Bolsa Família does 
not lead to a direct increase in school enrollment, this implies that Bolsa Família does not give 
long-term poverty reduction for the families, since they will not attain higher earnings in the 
future. The interviews show, however, that the short-term effect, i.e. the first dimension that 
aims at poverty relief, is achieved. This indicates that the children in the families might be 
stuck in dependency on the grant and that they are not provided with the tools to change their 
situation. In this case, the critique against Bolsa Família stating that the program “gives fish to 
the poor, but does not teach them how to fish”, is valid. 
 
The choice of using a regression discontinuity design might contribute to the negative results, 
because the design of the method means comparing similar groups but still with different 
income, and low income usually indicates lower school enrollment. The use of an estimation 
for the variable Receiving Bolsa Família could bias the results, in the same way as described 
above. However, because of the strong internal validity the method yields valid results. We 
also believe that by interviewing a larger number of families and using more in-depth 
interviews, the qualitative result would be more well-founded and include stronger evidence. 
Despite the lack of time in the field, we believe that the results of this thesis can still be used 
as a guideline for future studies.   
 
For future studies we would like to see more research regarding whether Bolsa Família has 
any impact on future earnings among the children of the beneficiary families, i.e. if increased 
school enrollment leads to higher future earnings. This is interesting since it would be a 
further evaluation of the program as well as an evaluation of the human capital theory. If the 
earnings have increased despite the negative effects on school enrollment, this would be a 
highly interesting link to examine. As an effect of this, it would be interesting to study the 
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quality of the public schools that the children of the beneficiaries attend, in order to find 
evidence of whether school is solely an institution for screening, and if the children would be 
better off and increase their human capital stock more from working than from studying. 
Also, the negative result would be interesting to follow up and further study the effectiveness 
of the control mechanisms in the program.  
 
  
 50 
Acknowledgements 
 
First of all we would like to thank our supervisors, Kaveh Majlesi at Lund University and 
Lauro Mattei at Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina for all the help, counseling and 
guidance. Secondly, we want to thank the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency for the financial support, which made it possible to do the interviews and collect 
relevant information in Florianópolis. Brazil. This thesis would not have been possible 
without the great help from the social assistants at CRAS Leste I and CRAS Norte I. A special 
thanks to Marina, Pricilla and Simone, for letting us accompany them in their work in order to 
do the interviews. Last, but not least, we want to thank all the women we interviewed, who 
struggle everyday to get a better life for themselves and their children.  
 
Thank you.  
  
 51 
List of References  
 
Ban Ki-Moon (2012), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2012, United Nations, pg. 
3, [Electronic Source], 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG%20Report%202012.pdf#page=17, 
Retrieved: 2013-03-19 
 
Barro, Robert and Lee, Jong-Wha (2010): A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the 
World, 1950-2010, NBER Working Paper No. 15902 
 
Becker, Gary S. (1965): A Theory of the Allocation of Time, The Economic Journal, Vol. 75, 
No. 299, pp. 493-517 
 
Boissiere, Maurice (2004): Rationale for Public Investments in Primary Education in 
Developing Countries, The World bank Operations Evaluation Department, The World Bank, 
Downloaded: 2013-03-01 
 
Bouillon, César P. and Tejerina, Luis R. (2007): Do We Know What Works? A Systematic 
Review of Impact Evaluations of Social Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-
American Development Bank, Sustainable Development Department 
 
Bourguignon, François; Ferreira, Francisco H.G. and Leite, Phillippe G. (2003): Conditional 
Cash Transfers, Schooling, and Child Labor: Micro-Simulating Brazil’s Bolsa Escola 
Program, The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 229-254 
 
Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert (1975): The Problem with Human Capital 
Theory - A Marxian Critique, American Economic association, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 74-82 
 
The Brazilian Government, [Electronic Source]: 
http://www.brasil.gov.br/para/press/press-releases/november-1/brazilian-middle-
class-reaches-52-of-total-population/br_model1?set_language=en, Retrieved: 2013-04-29 
 
Caixa Econômica Federal, [Electronic Source]:  
http://www1.caixa.gov.br/gov/gov_social/municipal/distribuicao_servicos_cidadao/cadastram
ento_unico/saiba_mais.asp, Retrieved: 2013-03-21 
 
Caixa Econômica Federal, folha 02.2013, extract from the Cadastro Único Register, 
[Electronic Source]: 
https://www.beneficiossociais.caixa.gov.br/consulta/beneficio/04.01.00-00_00.asp, 
Retrieved: 2013-02-21 
 
CEPAL, Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe, [Electronic Source]: 
http://interwp.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_cepalstat/Perfil_nacional_social.asp?Pais=BRA
&idioma=e, Retrieved: 2013-01-30 
 52 
 
Chattopadhyay, Saumen (2012): Education and Economics: Disciplinary Evolution and 
Policy Discourse, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
Coady, David (2003): Alleviating Structural Poverty in Developing Countries:  The Approach 
of PROGRESA in Mexico, [Electronic Source] http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/15/0001
60016_20031015131911/additional/310436360_20050276093444.pdf, Retrieved: 
2013-05-08 
 
Glewwe, Paul (2002): Schools and Skills in Developing Countries: Education Policies and 
Socioeconomic Outcomes, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XL (June 2002), pp. 436-482 
 
The Guardian, [Electronic Source]: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/06/brazil-economy-worlds-sixth-
largest, Retrieved: 2013-03-21 
 
Handa, Sudhanshu and Davis, Benjamin (2006): The Experience of Conditional Cash 
Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean, Development Policy Review, 24 (5), 513-536 
 
IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatísticas, [Electronic Source]: 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/presidencia/noticias/noticia_visualiza.php?id_noticia=2265&id
_pagina=1, Retrieved: 2013-02-07 
 
IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2011), Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra 
de Domicílios 2011, Rio de Janeiro, v. 31, p. 1-135, [Electronic Source]: 
ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/Trabalho_e_Rendimento/Pesquisa_Nacional_por_Amostra_de_Domi
cilios_anual/2011/Volume_Brasil/pnad_brasil_2011.pdf, Retrieved: 2013-03-08 
 
IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2011), Dicionário de Variáveis da 
PNAD2011 – arquivo das pessoas, [Electronic Source]:  
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/trabalhoerendimento/pnad2011
/microdados.shtm, Retrieved: 2013-04-26 
 
Imbens, Guido W. and Lemieux, Thomas (2007), Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide 
to Practice, Journal of Econometrics, doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.001 
 
Janvry, Alain de; Finan, Frederico and Sadoulet, Elisabeth (2006): Evaluating Brazil’s Bolsa 
Escola Program: Impact on Schooling and Municipal Roles, University of California at 
Berkeley 
 
Kremer, Michael (2003): Randomized Evaluations of Educational Programs in Developing 
Countries: Some Lessons, AEA Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 93 No. 2 
 
 53 
Lundberg, Shelly J.; Pollak, Robert A.; Wales Terence J. (1996): Do Husbands and Wives 
Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit, The Journal of 
Human Resources, XXXII, 3  
 
Lindert, Kathy (2006): Brazil: Bolsa Família Program – Scaling-up Cash Transfers for the 
poor, World Bank, MfDR Principles in Action: Sourcebook on Emerging Good Practices, 
Part 3. Examples of MfDR in Sector Programs and Projects, pp. 67-74 
 
MDS, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome, [Electronic Source]: 
http://www.mds.gov.br/saladeimprensa/noticias/2011/setembro/bolsa-familia-
ajusta-foco-na-protecao-a-crianca-e-cria-opcao-de-retorno-para-quem-se-desligar-do-
programa, Retrieved: 2013-03-08 
 
MDS, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome, [Electronic Source]: 
http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia/condicionalidades, Retrieved: 2013-03-10 
 
MDS, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome, [Electronic Source]: 
http://www.mds.gov.br/assistenciasocial/peti, Retrieved: 2013-03-21 
 
MDS, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome [Electronic Source]: 
http://aplicacoes.mds.gov.br/sagi/RIv3/geral/index.php, Retrieved: 2013-03-27 
 
MDS, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (2012), Relatório de Gestão 
do Exercício de 2011, pg. 27 
 
MEC, Ministério da Educação, Governo do Brasil, [Electronic Source]: 
http://portal.mec.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12521:inf, 
Retrieved: 2013-02-07 
 
The Mexican Government, [Electronic Source]: 
http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx/EVALUACION/es/wersd53465sdg1/matriz/avance
_indicadores_cuarto_trimestre_oportunidades2011.pdf, Retrieved: 2013-05-08 
 
Mincer, Jacob A. (1974): Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, Columbia University Press, 
New York and London 
 
OECD (2011): Economic Surveys: Brazil, [Electronic Source]: 
http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/48930900.pdf, Retrieved 2013-05-03 
 
OECD (2007): Human Capital - How what you know shapes your life, [Electronic Source]: 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/human-capital_9789264029095-en, 
Retrieved: 2013-01-17 
 
Oliveira, Ana Maria Hermeto Camilo de (2008): An Evaluation of the Bolsa Família Program 
in Brazil: Expenditures, Education and Labor Outcomes, CEDEPLAR/UFMG 
 54 
 
Patrinos, Harry Anthony and Psacharopoulos, George (2002): Returns to Investment in 
Education: A Further Update, Education Economics, Vol. 12, No. 2  
 
Plano Alto, [Electronic Source]: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-
2014/2011/Lei/L12382.htm, Retrieved: 2013-03-14 
 
Portal de Transparência, [Electronic Source]: 
http://www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br/graficos/bolsafamilia/, Retrieved: 2013-03-11 
 
Reimers, Fernando; DeShano da Silva, Carol and Trevino Ernesto (2006): Where is the 
“Education” in Conditional Cash Transfers in Education?, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
UIS Working Paper, No. 4 
 
Sánchez-Ancochea, Diego and Mattei, Lauro, (2011): Bolsa Família, Poverty and Inequality: 
Political and Economic Effects in the Short and Long Run, Global Social Policy, 11:299 
Saunders, Mark; Lewis, Philip and Thornhill, Adrian (2009): Research Methods for Business 
Students, 5th edition, Pearson Education Limited, Essex 
 
Schultz, T. Paul (2001): School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa 
Poverty Program, Yale University, Economic Growth Center, Center Discussion Paper, No. 
834 
 
Schultz, Theodore W. (1961): Investments in Human Capital, The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 1-17 
 
SENARC, Secretaria Nacional de Renda de Cidadania (2006): Programa Bolsa Família Guia 
do Gestor, Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome 
de Souza, Pedro H. G. F; Osorio, Rafael G and Soares Sergei S. O (2011): Uma Metodologia 
para Simular o Programa Bolsa Família, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Texto 
para discussão1654 
 
The Swedish Embassy in Brazil, (2009): Det brasilianska utbildningsväsendet, 
Telemeddelande (A), Mnr BRAS/20090618-1 
 
Szirmai, Adam (2005): The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Development - An introduction, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
 
Todaro, Michael P. and Smith, Stephen C. (2006): Economic Development, 9th Edition, 
Pearson Education, Essex 
 
UIS, UNESCO Institute of Statistics (2011): Global Education Digest 2011: Comparing 
 55 
Education Statistics Across the World 
 
UIS, UNESCO Institute of Statistics, [Electronic Source], 
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language
=eng&BR_Country=760&BR_Region=40520, Retrieved: 2013-01-23 
 
UIS, UNESCO Institute of Statistics, [Electronic Source]: 
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language
=eng&BR_Country=8400&BR_Region=40500, Retrieved: 2013-01-24 
 
Verbeek, Marno (2008), A Guide to Modern Econometrics, John Wiley & sons, West Sussex  
 
Web Center for Social Research Methods, [Electronic Source]: 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/quasird.php, Retrieved: 2013-03-04 
 
The World Data Bank, [Electronic Source]: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx?isshared=true&ispopular=c
ountry&pid=4, Retrieved: 2013-04-21 
 
 
 
  
 56 
Appendix 
Appendix 1 – Table over GNP in Brazil 2002 and 2010 
 
 
 
 
Source: IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatísticas: 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/presidencia/noticias/noticia_visualiza.php?id_noticia=2265&id_pagina=1, Retrieved: 2013-02-07 
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Appendix 2 – Income Transfer in Brazil 2011 of the Program Bolsa Família and 
Cartão Alimentacão 
 
 
Transferência de Renda 
Programa 
Famíli
as 
Repasse do 
mês dez/11 
Repasse acum. até dez/11 
Bolsa Família 
13.352
.306 
1.602.079.650,
00 
17.360.387.445,00 
Cartão Alimentação 1.537 76.850,00 1.492.600,00 
Total     
13.353
.843 
1.602.156.500,
00 
17.361.880.045,00 
Estimativa de famílias de baixa renda – Perfil Cadastro Único (Censo 2010): 20.094.955 / Cobertura: 
102,14% 1 
Estimativa de famílias pobres - Perfil Bolsa Família (CENSO 2010): 13.738.415 / Cobertura: 97,19% 
2 
 
MDS, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome [Electronic Source]: http://aplicacoes.mds.gov.br/sagi/RIv3/geral/index.php, Retrieved: 
2013-03-27 
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Appendix 3 – Variables from PNAD2011 That are Used in the Estimation 
 
 BGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2011), Dicionário de Variáveis da PNAD2011 – arquivo das pessoas, [Electronic Source]:  Retrieved: 
2013-04-26, http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/trabalhoerendimento/pnad2011/mcrodados.shtm 
Dicionário de variáveis da PNAD 2011 - arquivo de pessoas  
Microdados da Pesquisa Básica 
Posição Inicial Tamanho 
Código de 
variável 
Quesito Categorias 
N° Descrição Tipo Descrição 
5 2 UF 2 Unidade da Federação 
11 Rondônia 
12 Acre 
13 Amazonas 
14 Roraima 
15 Pará 
16 Amapá 
17 Tocantins 
21 Maranhão 
22 Piauí 
23 Ceará 
24 Rio Grande do Norte 
25 Paraíba 
26 Pernambuco 
27 Alagoas 
28 Sergipe 
29 Bahia 
31 Minas Gerais 
32 Espírito Santo 
33 Rio de Janeiro 
35 São Paulo 
41 Paraná 
42 Santa Catarina 
43 Rio Grande do Sul 
50 Mato Grosso do Sul 
51 Mato Grosso 
52 Goiás 
53 Distrito Federal 
18 1 V0302 2 Sexo 
2 Male 
4 Female 
23 4 V3033 3 Ano de nascimento 
0000 a 0098 
Idade presumida ou 
estimada em anos 
1890 a 2010 Ano 
70 1 V0602 2 
Frequenta escola ou 
creche 
2 Sim 
4 Não 
721 12 V4721   
Rendimento mensal 
domiciliar para todas as 
unidades domiciliares  
Valor R$ 
999 999 999 999 Sem declaração 
  Não aplicável 
745 2 V4723   
Tipo de família para 
todas as unidades 
domiciliares (em todos 
os tipos de família 
podem existir pessoas 
cuja condição na família 
era outro parente, 
agregado, pensionista, 
empregado doméstico ou 
parente do empregado 
doméstico) 
01 Casal sem filhos 
02 
Casal com todos os filhos 
menores de 14 anos 
03 
Casal com todos os filhos 
de 14 anos ou mais 
04 
Casal com filhos 
menores de 14 anos e de 
14 anos ou mais 
06 
Mãe com todos os filhos 
menores de 14 anos 
07 
Mãe com todos os filhos 
de 14 anos ou mais 
08 
Mãe com filhos menores 
de 14 anos e de 14 anos 
ou mais 
10 Outros tipos de família 
750 1 V4728   
Código de situação 
censitária 
1 
Urbana - Cidade ou vila, 
área urbanizada 
2 
Urbana - Cidade ou vila, 
área não-urbanizada 
3 
Urbana - Área urbana 
isolada 
4 
Rural - Aglomerado rural 
de extensão urbana 
5 
Rural - Aglomerado rural, 
isolado, povoado 
6 
Rural - Aglomerado rural, 
isolado, núcleo 
7 
Rural - Aglomerado rural, 
isolado, outros 
aglomerados 
8 
Rural – Zona rural 
exclusive aglomerado 
rural  
764 2 V4741   
Número de componentes 
do domícilio  
01 a 30 Pessoas 
  Não aplicável 
766 12 V4742   
Rendimento mensal 
domiciliar per capita  
Valor R$ 
999 999 999 999 Sem declaração 
  Não aplicável 
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Appendix 4 - Questionnaire  
 
 
1. Do you receive Bolsa Família? 
2. Which year did you start receiving Bolsa Família? / When were you blocked from 
Bolsa Família?  
3. Do you receive Bolsa Família since then, or have you been blocked sometime? 
4. Which is the monthly grant you receive/received from Bolsa Família? 
5. Do you believe that the grant you receive from Bolsa Família is/was sufficient? 
6. How many children are there in the family? How old are they? 
7. How many people are living in the household? 
8. Do you have a temporal or permanent job? 
9. For how many years did you attend school?  
10. Are your children enrolled in school?  
11. If yes, how many days per week do they attend school? 
12. Are free school meals served in the school your children attend?  
13. Do you have to pay for school uniform? School material? 
14.  Is the school in walking distance from your home? 
15. How many students are there per teacher in the school that your children attend? 
16. Did the children have to retake any class? 
17. If you receive Bolsa Família, on what do you believe you spend the extra income?  
18. Has Bolsa Família changed your choices you make? / Did your choices change after 
losing Bolsa Família? 
19. Do you believe that the family’s living standard has increased/decreased after you 
started to receive/after losing Bolsa Família? 
20. Do you believe that Bolsa Família has increased the possibility for your children to 
attend school?  
21. If you do not receive Bolsa Família, do you think receiving Bolsa Família would 
increase the possibility to send your children to school?  
22. Do you think your children will receive a higher salary in the future because they 
attend school? 
23. Do you believe that receiving Bolsa Família is socially accepted in the society? 
24. Is it socially considered as something embarrassing to receive Bolsa Família? 
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Appendix 5 – Second Regression, Entire Sample, Original Bandwidth 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1,010 ,032  31,168 ,000 
Bolsa Família -,025 ,008 -,050 -3,215 ,001 
Monthly Household Income ,000 ,000 -,120 -4,456 ,000 
dum_gender -,014 ,007 -,028 -1,916 ,055 
dum_parents2 -,049 ,010 -,080 -4,940 ,000 
dum_rural -,007 ,009 -,012 -,792 ,429 
dum_children2 ,044 ,020 ,074 2,142 ,032 
dum_children3 ,086 ,021 ,166 4,121 ,000 
dum_children4 ,113 ,025 ,222 4,460 ,000 
dum_acre -,039 ,035 -,021 -1,099 ,272 
dum_amazonas -,036 ,028 -,031 -1,291 ,197 
dum_roraima ,002 ,040 ,001 ,059 ,953 
dum_pará -,027 ,025 -,032 -1,066 ,287 
dum_amapá -,043 ,035 -,023 -1,222 ,222 
dum_tocantins -,013 ,033 -,008 -,406 ,684 
dum_maranhao -,048 ,028 -,041 -1,700 ,089 
dum_piauí -,034 ,032 -,021 -1,042 ,297 
dum_ceará -,018 ,026 -,019 -,699 ,485 
dum_riograndedonorte -,081 ,033 -,049 -2,466 ,014 
dum_paraíba -,002 ,030 -,001 -,063 ,950 
dum_pernambuco -,050 ,026 -,058 -1,965 ,049 
dum_alagoas -,094 ,030 -,068 -3,139 ,002 
dum_sergipe ,003 ,032 ,002 ,082 ,934 
dum_bahia -,030 ,025 -,039 -1,220 ,222 
dum_minasgerais -,028 ,026 -,029 -1,065 ,287 
dum_espíritosantos ,016 ,041 ,007 ,399 ,690 
dum_riodejaneiro -,051 ,029 -,041 -1,759 ,079 
dum_saopaulo -,042 ,029 -,032 -1,423 ,155 
dum_paraná -,050 ,035 -,028 -1,449 ,147 
dum_santacatarina -,084 ,044 -,032 -1,897 ,058 
dum_riograndedosul -,028 ,029 -,022 -,961 ,337 
dum_matogrossodosul -,008 ,050 -,003 -,169 ,866 
dum_matogrosso ,014 ,036 ,007 ,386 ,700 
dum_goiás -,027 ,032 -,017 -,855 ,392 
dum_distritofederal -,036 ,041 -,015 -,862 ,389 
a. Dependent Variable: dum_schoolenrollment 
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Appendix 6 – Second Regression, Teenagers, Original Bandwidth 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1,023 ,117  8,744 ,000 
Bolsa Família -,059 ,029 -,070 -2,026 ,043 
Monthly Household Income ,000 ,000 -,196 -3,071 ,002 
dum_gender -,078 ,028 -,092 -2,789 ,005 
dum_acre -,277 ,132 -,085 -2,094 ,037 
dum_amazonas -,021 ,101 -,011 -,212 ,832 
dum_roraima -,055 ,163 -,013 -,338 ,736 
dum_pará -,054 ,092 -,037 -,591 ,555 
dum_amapá -,212 ,139 -,061 -1,524 ,128 
dum_tocantins -,076 ,126 -,025 -,603 ,547 
dum_maranhao -,143 ,101 -,074 -1,420 ,156 
dum_piauí -,169 ,119 -,062 -1,414 ,158 
dum_ceará -,051 ,094 -,033 -,541 ,588 
dum_riograndedonorte -,187 ,119 -,068 -1,575 ,116 
dum_paraíba ,060 ,109 ,026 ,554 ,580 
dum_pernambuco -,174 ,092 -,121 -1,901 ,058 
dum_alagoas -,214 ,109 -,092 -1,958 ,051 
dum_sergipe -,033 ,126 -,011 -,264 ,792 
dum_bahia -,105 ,089 -,082 -1,190 ,234 
dum_minasgerais -,130 ,097 -,075 -1,343 ,180 
dum_espíritosantos -,017 ,179 -,003 -,093 ,926 
dum_riodejaneiro -,142 ,103 -,069 -1,371 ,171 
dum_saopaulo -,167 ,112 -,068 -1,487 ,137 
dum_paraná -,049 ,130 -,015 -,377 ,707 
dum_santacatarina -,347 ,163 -,080 -2,132 ,033 
dum_riograndedosul -,137 ,106 -,062 -1,286 ,199 
dum_matogrossodosul -,047 ,205 -,008 -,229 ,819 
dum_matogrosso ,089 ,146 ,024 ,607 ,544 
dum_goiás -,121 ,117 -,045 -1,031 ,303 
dum_children2 ,113 ,069 ,116 1,644 ,101 
dum_children3 ,199 ,072 ,217 2,753 ,006 
dum_parents2 -,111 ,036 -,113 -3,038 ,002 
dum_rural -,025 ,034 -,025 -,725 ,469 
dum_children4 ,282 ,091 ,323 3,103 ,002 
dum_distritofederal -,123 ,150 -,031 -,816 ,415 
a. Dependent Variable: dum_schoolenrollment 
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Appendix 7 – Second Regression, Entire Sample, Smaller Bandwidth 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) ,997 ,037  27,066 ,000 
Bolsa Família -,026 ,009 -,053 -2,990 ,003 
Monthly Household Income ,000 ,000 -,113 -3,586 ,000 
dum_gender -,013 ,008 -,027 -1,577 ,115 
dum_children2 ,072 ,023 ,124 3,095 ,002 
dum_children3 ,118 ,024 ,228 4,894 ,000 
dum_acre -,045 ,042 -,023 -1,076 ,282 
dum_amazonas -,037 ,031 -,034 -1,199 ,231 
dum_roraima ,001 ,043 ,001 ,033 ,974 
dum_pará -,028 ,028 -,034 -,990 ,322 
dum_amapá -,072 ,041 -,039 -1,776 ,076 
dum_tocantins -,037 ,038 -,021 -,962 ,336 
dum_maranhao -,070 ,032 -,060 -2,215 ,027 
dum_piauí -,060 ,039 -,034 -1,550 ,121 
dum_ceará -,043 ,030 -,045 -1,468 ,142 
dum_riograndedonorte -,083 ,036 -,055 -2,320 ,020 
dum_paraíba -,001 ,035 -,001 -,032 ,974 
dum_pernambuco -,075 ,029 -,084 -2,588 ,010 
dum_alagoas -,127 ,034 -,090 -3,685 ,000 
dum_sergipe -,006 ,038 -,004 -,173 ,863 
dum_bahia -,054 ,028 -,069 -1,921 ,055 
dum_minasgerais -,027 ,030 -,028 -,910 ,363 
dum_espíritosantos -,011 ,046 -,005 -,242 ,809 
dum_riodejaneiro -,071 ,033 -,057 -2,181 ,029 
dum_saopaulo -,059 ,033 -,047 -1,814 ,070 
dum_paraná -,086 ,041 -,045 -2,116 ,034 
dum_santacatarina -,124 ,048 -,051 -2,582 ,010 
dum_riograndedosul -,046 ,033 -,037 -1,425 ,154 
dum_matogrossodosul -,032 ,057 -,010 -,553 ,580 
dum_matogrosso ,012 ,044 ,006 ,281 ,779 
dum_goiás -,057 ,035 -,039 -1,639 ,101 
dum_parents2 -,045 ,012 -,073 -3,869 ,000 
dum_rural -,018 ,010 -,032 -1,811 ,070 
dum_children4 ,141 ,029 ,273 4,794 ,000 
dum_distritofederal -,087 ,048 -,036 -1,830 ,067 
a. Dependent Variable: dum_schoolenrollment 
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Appendix 8 – Second Regression, Teenagers, Smaller Bandwidth 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1,008 ,138  7,328 ,000 
Bolsa Família -,070 ,035 -,081 -1,995 ,046 
Monthly Household Income ,000 ,000 -,173 -2,331 ,020 
dum_gender -,084 ,033 -,098 -2,525 ,012 
dum_children2 ,199 ,080 ,209 2,479 ,013 
dum_children3 ,297 ,085 ,321 3,483 ,001 
dum_acre -,329 ,169 -,088 -1,941 ,053 
dum_amazonas -,101 ,115 -,055 -,876 ,381 
dum_roraima -,038 ,187 -,009 -,206 ,837 
dum_pará -,070 ,107 -,047 -,652 ,514 
dum_amapá -,318 ,151 -,102 -2,104 ,036 
dum_tocantins -,188 ,157 -,056 -1,198 ,231 
dum_maranhao -,224 ,117 -,114 -1,908 ,057 
dum_piauí -,371 ,158 -,110 -2,342 ,019 
dum_ceará -,152 ,109 -,098 -1,399 ,162 
dum_riograndedonorte -,238 ,131 -,096 -1,818 ,069 
dum_paraíba ,054 ,129 ,023 ,422 ,673 
dum_pernambuco -,285 ,108 -,192 -2,645 ,008 
dum_alagoas -,406 ,130 -,169 -3,132 ,002 
dum_sergipe -,100 ,154 -,031 -,648 ,517 
dum_bahia -,210 ,104 -,160 -2,029 ,043 
dum_minasgerais -,141 ,115 -,077 -1,226 ,221 
dum_espíritosantos -,129 ,196 -,028 -,659 ,510 
dum_riodejaneiro -,199 ,121 -,096 -1,643 ,101 
dum_saopaulo -,217 ,126 -,096 -1,723 ,085 
dum_paraná -,148 ,146 -,049 -1,019 ,309 
dum_santacatarina -,563 ,186 -,133 -3,023 ,003 
dum_riograndedosul -,214 ,123 -,098 -1,737 ,083 
dum_matogrossodosul -,096 ,232 -,017 -,413 ,680 
dum_matogrosso -,008 ,177 -,002 -,047 ,962 
dum_goiás -,251 ,132 -,100 -1,908 ,057 
dum_parents2 -,114 ,043 -,113 -2,638 ,009 
dum_rural -,061 ,041 -,061 -1,490 ,137 
dum_children4 ,357 ,107 ,399 3,340 ,001 
dum_distritofederal -,231 ,163 -,065 -1,420 ,156 
a. Dependent Variable: dum_schoolenrollment 
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Appendix 9 – Results from Interviews 
 
Respondent 
Question 
Receives 
Bolsa 
Família For how long 
Been 
interrupted 
Monthly grant 
from Bolsa 
Família in BRL 
Is the grant 
enough 
How many 
children (age) 
1 No 
Blocked since feb-13. 
Received Bolsa 
Família since 
beginning of 2004 2 times 236 Helps a lot 
5 (2, 4, 12, 14, 
16) 
2 Yes 09-aug Never 166 No 4 (3, 7, 17, 22) 
3 Yes 12-dez Never 102 No 
2 (2 months, 4 
years) 
4 Yes 07-feb Never 165 No 3 (2, 4, 8) 
5 Yes 13-feb Never 110 No 1 (6) 
6 Yes 12-feb Never 204 No 
6 (2, 13, 14, 17, 
21 , 22) 
7 No 
Blocked since feb-13. 
Received Bolsa 
Família since 
beginning of 2008 - 166 No, but helps a lot 2 (2, 9) 
8 Yes 05-may Never 102 - 1 (14) 
9 No 08-aug Since 13-mar 32 
She gave the 
granddaughter 
the grant, so the 
respondent 
believes it was 
good for the 
granddaughter 
1 grandchild 
(15) 
10 No Approx. Ten years Since 13-feb 102 
Helps a lot but 
does not make a 
great difference 4 (13, 14, 17, ?) 
Number of 
answers 10 10 9 10 9 10 
  
6 Yes        
4 No   
5 Never          2 
once            1 
twice 138,5 
6 Not enough                                             
3 Helps a lot Average: 2,9 
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Continued Appendix 9 – Results from Interviews 
 
Respondent 
Question 
People living 
in the 
household Works 
For how many 
years 
respondent 
attended 
school 
School 
Enrollment 
among 
children 
How 
many 
days 
attend 
school 
Free 
school 
meals 
Pay for school 
uniform 
1 7 
Temporal as 
cleaner 
Elementary 
school - eight 
years 
All but the 
oldest child 5 Snack 
Yes, one t-shirt per 
child à 12 BRL. 
Believes its very 
costly 
2 4 
Permanent, 
but currently 
ill 
Elementary 
school - eight 
years All children 5 Snack 
No, cannot afford 
uniform 
3 3 No 
High school - 12 
years Kindergarten 5 All meals No 
4 5 
Temporal as 
cleaner 
Elementary 
school - eight 
years 
School and 
kindergarten 5 All meals No (25 BRL) 
5 3 
Temporal as 
cleaner 
High school - 11 
years School 5 Snack Yes 
6 6 
Permanent 
at a bakery 
Elementary 
school - eight 
years All aged 0-17 5 Snack 
No, believes it is 
too expensive 
7 5 
Temporal as 
cleaner 
Elementary 
school - eight 
years 
Oldest in 
school, 
youngest not 
in 
kindergarten 5 Snack 
Yes, but only t-
shirt so far (15 
BRL) 
8 2 
Temporal as 
cleaner 4th grade School 5 Snack 
No, was given 
three old ones 
9 4 Retired 
Elementary 
school - eight 
years School 5 Snack 
Bought t-shirt 17 
BRL. Not bought 
pants for 80 BRL 
10 6 
Permanent 
as a cleaner 
Elementary 
school - eight 
years 
The two 
youngest 
attend school, 
the two 
oldest work 5 
One 
receives 
snack, 
the other 
do not  
Yes, bough for son 
and one t-shirt for 
daughter 
Number of 
answers 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
  Average: 4,5 
3 Permanent      
5 Temporal           
1 Retired               
1 No job 
7 Elementary 
school     2 High 
school                
1 Until 4th 
grade   5 
7 Snack            
2 All 
meals        
1 Snack 1 
all 
4 Yes                                
1 Only t-shirt, no 
pants  5 No 
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Continued Appendix 9 – Results from Interviews 
 
 
 
Respondent 
Question 
Distance to 
school 
How many 
students per 
teacher 
Had to retake 
any class 
What spend 
grant on 
Living 
standard 
Socially 
accepted 
receiving 
Bolsa Família 
Embarrassing 
receiving 
1 
Walking/Biki
ng distance 
School: 20. 
Kindergarten: 
15 
One child had 
to retake 
Food and 
things for the 
children Increased - No 
2 
Walking 
distance - No - - - - 
3 
Walking 
distance 15 - Milk for baby 
Not enough 
to increase 
the living 
standard Yes No 
4 
Walking 
distance 32-36 No 
Diaper, milk, 
food and 
things for the 
children - Yes Sometimes 
5 
Bus, does 
not have to 
pay for it 25-30 - 
Everything, 
the  only 
income the 
family has - Yes No 
6 
Walking, 
one 
kilometer Approx. 30 - 
Diapers, 
shoes, 
clothes and 
school 
material Increased Yes No 
7 
Bus, pays for 
it (half the 
price for 
students) 30 - 
Clothes, 
shoes, school 
material and 
food Increased Yes No 
8 
Walking 
distance 
Does not 
know - 
Everything: 
gas, milk, 
food and 
clothes - No No 
9 
Walking 
distance, 
sometimes 
walks and 
sometimes 
bus 30 3 times 
Internet in 
the house - 
gave  the 
grant to the 
granddaught
er  - Yes No 
10 
One walking 
distance the 
other one 
bus 30/52 No 
Bus ticket for 
daughter 
who studies 
downtown - No No 
Number of 
answers 10 9 4 9 4 8 9 
  
7 Walking                      
2 Bus                                
1 Walking 1 
Bus 
Average for 
school: 32,6 
3 No                          
2 Yes   
3 Increased         
1 Not 
enough 
6 Yes                         
2 No 
8 No                    
1 Sometimes 
